https://exploit-intel.com/blog/tags/ai/EIP research articles tagged ai.en-usThu, 13 Aug 2026 20:23:48 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/eip-v3-the-exploit-database-we-meant-to-build/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/eip-v3-the-exploit-database-we-meant-to-build/EIP v3 is a rebuilt exploit intelligence system with searchable PoC code, a public read-only API, CLI and MCP, and a review-gated Kimi/Ollama pipeline that publishes CVE labs into the corpus.Thu, 13 Aug 2026 19:53:09 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/wp-google-map-plugin/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/wp-google-map-plugin/Line 781 says $query_to_run is safe. It isn't. An autonomous pipeline found a CVSS 9.8 unauthenticated SQL injection in WP Google Map Plugin v4.9.1 -- a three-link chain of individually harmless components that, together, give any visitor full database access. Then we kept reading and found the plugin deserializes update-check responses from an external server with maybe_unserialize(). 200,000+ active installs. 35 minutes. $8.97.Sun, 29 Mar 2026 00:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cve-2026-4105-systemd-machined-privilege-escalation/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cve-2026-4105-systemd-machined-privilege-escalation/CVE-2026-4105 dropped this morning - local privilege escalation to root on desktop Linux via systemd-machined. Two D-Bus calls, no authentication. We fed it to CVEForge before the advisory was an hour old. Seventy-two minutes later: confirmed exploit, Docker labs for vulnerable and patched builds, and a bypass proving the vendor's fix is incomplete. The analysis agent said the fix was thorough. The bypass agent proved it wrong.Fri, 13 Mar 2026 22:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cve-2026-28391-openclaw-command-injection-the-day-i-hacked-myself/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cve-2026-28391-openclaw-command-injection-the-day-i-hacked-myself/CVE-2026-28391 is a CVSS 9.8 command injection in OpenClaw < 2026.2.2, caused by a POSIX vs cmd.exe shell-parsing mismatch. Our own suggestion algorithm ranked it as the most interesting CVEForge target. 8/8 bypass vectors confirmed, code execution verified. This is the story of the day our orchestration layer dispatched a full vulnerability assessment against itself.Mon, 09 Mar 2026 12:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/introducing-fuzzforge-autonomous-source-fuzzing-nginx/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/introducing-fuzzforge-autonomous-source-fuzzing-nginx/We forked Shannon a third time. Seven AI agents, source code as the starting point, sanitizer-instrumented builds, and a pipeline that read 259 C files, built its own fuzzing harnesses, ran 18,000 iterations, and found a previously unknown FastCGI protocol desynchronization bug in nginx. Two hours. Twenty-five dollars.Sun, 08 Mar 2026 12:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cve-2025-68670-xrdp-from-crash-to-rce-the-one-that-fought-back/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cve-2025-68670-xrdp-from-crash-to-rce-the-one-that-fought-back/The first post ended with 'not a shell.' This one ends with uid=0(root) - with an asterisk. Ten context windows. A UTF-8 encoding barrier that blocks every libc address. A PLT mapping that lied. A stack alignment problem solved by a NULL pointer and a filename that shouldn't exist. The story of how a pre-auth xrdp overflow became (almost) pure-network RCE - through the most absurd gadget chain we've ever built.Wed, 04 Mar 2026 22:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cve-2025-68670-xrdp-pre-auth-overflow-the-hard-one/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cve-2025-68670-xrdp-pre-auth-overflow-the-hard-one/xrdp. Pre-authentication. A full RDP handshake implemented from scratch. UTF-8 encoding constraints that break your ROP chain. A false crash path that wasted hours. And a 3-byte partial overwrite technique that reaches any address in the binary. Stackforge's hardest target yet - and the most honest result.Wed, 04 Mar 2026 18:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cve-2025-62507-redis-stackforge-from-crash-to-rce-with-aslr/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cve-2025-62507-redis-stackforge-from-crash-to-rce-with-aslr/The public material available during this CVE-2025-62507 run was a crash PoC. StackForge pursued RCE, then repeated the work with ASLR enabled.Tue, 03 Mar 2026 18:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cve-2025-15467-openssl-stackforge-autonomous-binary-exploit/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cve-2025-15467-openssl-stackforge-autonomous-binary-exploit/We forked Shannon again - this time for binary exploit development. Nine AI agents, GDB as an MCP tool, packet capture via SharkMCP, and a pipeline that turned an OpenSSL stack buffer overflow into three independent ROP chains with GDB-verified RCE. Eighty-five minutes. Twenty-five dollars. Here's how Stackforge works.Tue, 03 Mar 2026 12:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cve-2025-26866-hugegraph-hessian-deserialization-autonomous-exploit/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cve-2025-26866-hugegraph-hessian-deserialization-autonomous-exploit/CVE-2025-26866 is a Hessian deserialization RCE in Apache HugeGraph PD. Our autonomous exploit pipeline CVEForge - which had completed 56 consecutive CVEs - hit a wall: an undocumented binary protocol, a non-standard serialization format, and a class blacklist blocking every known gadget chain. The agent spent $49 and four hours reverse-engineering SOFABolt, mapping sofa-hessian byte by byte, and finding a JDK-only gadget chain to bypass the blacklist. Then we took over to turn file creation into a proper root shell - navigating JNDI hardening, CC library defenses, and a gadget chain that silently dies on modern JDK. The result: a full Metasploit module.Sun, 01 Mar 2026 18:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/72-hours-24-cves-the-cveforge-stress-test/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/72-hours-24-cves-the-cveforge-stress-test/We left CVEForge running for three days. Twenty-four CVEs went in. All twenty-four produced working PoCs. Ten incomplete fixes triggered eight responsible disclosure submissions - six GitHub issues, one MITRE report, one HackerOne 0-day. Here's the full accounting.Sat, 28 Feb 2026 18:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/five-cves-three-bypasses-java-case-study/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/five-cves-three-bypasses-java-case-study/In this CVEForge patch-validation run, we analyze CVE-2025-60355 in OneBlog (Java/FreeMarker) and compare outcomes across five CVEs. Three of five runs ended in confirmed bypass or incomplete-fix results.Fri, 27 Feb 2026 12:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/zero-to-rce-autonomous-exploit-development/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/zero-to-rce-autonomous-exploit-development/After CVEForge's first successful run, we needed to know if it was luck or a pattern. Two more CVEs, zero hand-holding, and an AI agent that found a fix bypass the developers missed.Thu, 26 Feb 2026 12:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cveforge-from-shannon-to-autonomous-poc/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/cveforge-from-shannon-to-autonomous-poc/We forked Shannon - the open-source AI pentesting framework - and wired it to the EIP MCP server. Six AI agents, one CVE number, 32 minutes: a working RCE PoC for a CVSS 10.0 vulnerability with zero existing public exploits. Here's how it happened.Wed, 25 Feb 2026 12:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/from-cve-to-bypass-with-mcp/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/from-cve-to-bypass-with-mcp/One prompt kicked off an AI agent that built a full PoC lab for CVE-2026-28296 - and discovered the GVFS CRLF injection fix was incomplete. Here's how it happened.Tue, 24 Feb 2026 12:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/introducing-eip-mcp-server/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/introducing-eip-mcp-server/The story behind EIP MCP, with current setup guidance: tell your agent to connect to the hosted endpoint, or install the optional local eip-mcp package through pipx.Fri, 20 Feb 2026 12:00:00 -0400https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/anatomy-of-a-trojan-exploit/https://exploit-intel.com/blog/posts/anatomy-of-a-trojan-exploit/Concrete examples of credential stealers, obfuscated backdoors, and destructive payloads found in public PoC material, with model interpretation kept separate from EIP safety claims.Sun, 15 Feb 2026 12:00:00 -0400