Xavi Beltran
Source-scoped identity with 5 associated PoCs and 4 linked vulnerabilities.
Exploit catalog results
Showing 5 PoCs on this page
ExploitDBThrottlestop Kernel Driver - Kernel Out-of-Bounds Write Privilege Escalation
ExploitDB exploitPublished 2026-04-22ExploitCVE-2025-77711 file
Analysis
Technical assessment
C source code that installs the vulnerable ThrottleStop.sys driver, opens a handle to it, and uses the exposed IOCTL (0x8000645C) to perform arbitrary physical memory reads and writes. It walks the EPROCESS list to locate lsass.exe, then writes zeros to its Protection and SignatureLevel fields to disable PPL, and finally injects a DLL into LSASS via AddSecurityPackageA.
Backdoor review
No backdoor observed in reviewed code
The PoC is a standard local privilege escalation exploit that uses a vulnerable driver to disable LSASS process protection and then loads a DLL via AddSecurityPackageA. No concealed backdoor, unrelated remote access, persistence, or credential exfiltration logic was observed. The code performs only the documented exploit steps.
Classification basis and observed behavior
Classification basis
The code actively exploits the vulnerability by sending the vulnerable IOCTL to perform physical memory writes that disable LSASS protections and then injects a DLL. This is a full privilege escalation exploit, not merely a scanner or writeup.
exploits/windows/local/52512.txt:1-248Requirements
- Local execution on a Windows system where the vulnerable ThrottleStop.sys driver can be loaded (e.g., via service creation).
exploits/windows/local/52512.txt:150-191 - Ability to create a kernel service (requires Administrator or equivalent privileges).
exploits/windows/local/52512.txt:160-176
Observed behavior
- Creates a kernel service to load the ThrottleStop.sys driver from C:\Users\Public\a.sys.
exploits/windows/local/52512.txt:156-191 - Opens a handle to the ThrottleStop device and sends IOCTL 0x8000645C to map physical memory for arbitrary read/write.
exploits/windows/local/52512.txt:196-212exploits/windows/local/52512.txt:55-89exploits/windows/local/52512.txt:91-125 - Reads the ntoskrnl.exe base address and uses it to locate the System EPROCESS, then walks the ActiveProcessLinks list to find the lsass.exe EPROCESS.
exploits/windows/local/52512.txt:193-233 - Writes 0 to the Protection (offset 0x6ca) and SignatureLevel (offset 0x6c8) fields of the lsass.exe EPROCESS to disable PPL.
exploits/windows/local/52512.txt:237-240 - Calls AddSecurityPackageA to load ntssp.dll into the LSASS process, achieving code injection.
exploits/windows/local/52512.txt:243-245
Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict
Observables
- Exploit Behavior
- Payload withheldThis is the intended exploit payload for privilege escalation and credential dumping, consistent with the CVE description.
exploits/windows/local/52512.txt:237-245 - Driver Installation
- Payload withheldStandard method to load the vulnerable driver for exploitation.
exploits/windows/local/52512.txt:156-191 - Ioctl Usage
- Payload withheldMatches the documented vulnerability in ThrottleStop.sys.
exploits/windows/local/52512.txt:19exploits/windows/local/52512.txt:75-79
What the analysis did not establish
- The evidence is the complete source code of the exploit; no external dependencies (e.g., superfetch library) are provided, so the code cannot be compiled or executed from this artifact alone.
- The analysis treats the code as untrusted data and does not verify its correctness or safety.
- Only the supplied text file was reviewed; no binary files were present.
- The DLL loaded (ntssp.dll) is a standard Windows SSP DLL; its behavior is not analyzed, but its use is a known post-exploitation technique for credential access.
- The driver file (a.sys) is not included in the evidence; its contents are not verified.
This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.