Exploit catalog results

Showing 25 PoCs on this page

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2026-60004

Repository PoCStars: 1Created 2026-07-30
ExploitCVE-2026-600043 files

8.9 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

The artifact is a Python script (poc.py) that exploits CVE-2026-60004 in Gitea by sending a crafted patch twice to the diffpatch API, triggering a three-way merge fallback that writes a malicious Git hook to the server's bare repository, resulting in remote code execution via a reverse shell.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The supplied evidence consists of a Dockerfile, README, and Python PoC script for CVE-2026-60004. The PoC script constructs and sends a patch to a Gitea instance to achieve RCE via a reverse shell. All behavior is consistent with the stated exploit goal; no concealed backdoor, deceptive payload, or operator-directed harm beyond the described exploit is observed.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence100%
AuthenticationRequired
Languagespython
Target softwareGitea
Attack typesremote code executionreverse shell
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The script actively exploits the vulnerability by sending a malicious payload to the target server to achieve remote code execution, as opposed to merely detecting or reporting the vulnerability.

poc.py:1-56README.md:3

Requirements

  • Target Gitea instance must be vulnerable (versions 1.17 through 1.27.0).README.md:21-22
  • Attacker must have write access to a repository on the target Gitea instance (e.g., via open registration).README.md:13README.md:50
  • Attacker must provide valid credentials (username and password) for the target Gitea instance.poc.py:8-9
  • A listener (e.g., netcat) must be running on a host reachable from the Gitea server to receive the reverse shell.README.md:70-72

Observed behavior

  • Constructs a reverse shell command and embeds it in a Git hook script (payload withheld).poc.py:17-19
  • Generates a Git patch that creates the hook file with executable permissions.poc.py:23-31
  • Sends the same patch twice via HTTP POST to the Gitea diffpatch API endpoint to trigger the vulnerability.poc.py:41-44
  • The second request may time out while the reverse shell is active, which the script treats as a possible success.poc.py:50-53
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Reverse Shell
Payload withheldThe PoC script generates a reverse shell command to the attacker-controlled host and port, which is the stated purpose of the exploit.poc.py:17
Base64 Encoding
Payload withheldThe reverse shell command is base64-encoded before embedding in the hook, a common technique to avoid shell metacharacter issues, not an attempt at concealment.poc.py:18
Git Hook Installation
Payload withheldThe patch creates an executable post-index-change hook in the bare repository's working tree, which is the documented RCE mechanism.poc.py:24
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • The analysis is based solely on the provided text files; the code was not executed, and its effectiveness or safety is not verified.
  • Only the three text files (Dockerfile, README.md, poc.py) were provided; no other repository content was reviewed.
  • The review does not verify that the PoC works as described or that it is safe to execute in any environment.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2026-16723

Repository PoCStars: 1Created 2026-07-30
ExploitCVE-2026-167239 files

28.1 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

The artifact is a full exploit for CVE-2026-16723, a remote code execution vulnerability in Fastjson 1.2.68–1.2.83. The Python script `attacker/exploit.py` builds a malicious JAR containing Java classes with a static initializer that executes a reverse shell command, serves the JAR via HTTP, constructs a JSON payload that triggers a class-resource lookup in Fastjson's `checkAutoType` to fetch and load the remote JAR, and then listens for the reverse shell connection.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The supplied evidence describes a PoC exploit for CVE-2026-16723, a Fastjson RCE vulnerability. The exploit script (attacker/exploit.py) builds a malicious JAR, serves it via HTTP, and delivers a crafted JSON payload to trigger remote code execution, ultimately providing a reverse shell. All behavior is consistent with the stated exploit goal and no concealed backdoor, unrelated payload, or operator-directed harm beyond the normal exploit was observed.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence98%
AuthenticationNot required
LanguagesPythonJava bytecode
Target softwareFastjson 1.2.68–1.2.83
Attack typesRemote Code ExecutionDeserialization of Untrusted DataServer-Side Request Forgery
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The artifact contains a complete, self-contained Python script (`attacker/exploit.py`) that builds a malicious JAR, serves it, generates an exploit payload, and listens for a reverse shell. The README explicitly describes it as a PoC and provides step-by-step instructions for achieving remote code execution. This is code intended to exercise a vulnerability, not merely detect or report it.

attacker/exploit.py:1-243README.md:3README.md:49-87

Requirements

  • Target application uses Fastjson 1.2.68–1.2.83 with default configuration (AutoType disabled) and parses attacker-controlled JSON.README.md:8-11README.md:31-33
  • Target application is packaged as a Spring Boot executable fat-JAR.README.md:9README.md:33
  • Attacker can reach the target over the network and the target can make outbound HTTP connections to the attacker's machine.README.md:50-51

Observed behavior

  • Builds a JAR file containing a seed class and multiple payload classes. Each payload class has a static initializer (`<clinit>`) that executes a reverse shell command via `Runtime.getRuntime().exec`.attacker/exploit.py:76-128attacker/exploit.py:199-210
  • Starts an HTTP server to serve the malicious JAR to the target.attacker/exploit.py:151-155attacker/exploit.py:221
  • Constructs a JSON payload containing crafted `@type` values that cause Fastjson to fetch the attacker's JAR via `jar:http://` and then load classes via `jar:file:/proc/self/fd/` to achieve code execution.attacker/exploit.py:213-218
  • Starts a TCP listener to accept the reverse shell connection from the compromised target.attacker/exploit.py:158-184attacker/exploit.py:239
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Reverse Shell
Payload withheldThe exploit establishes a reverse shell to the attacker's machine, which is the intended outcome of the RCE PoC.attacker/exploit.py:199-201
Payload Generation
Payload withheldThe script builds a JAR with a class whose <clinit> method runs Runtime.exec() with the reverse shell command, triggered by Fastjson deserialization.attacker/exploit.py:76-128attacker/exploit.py:206-210
Http Server
Payload withheldThe script starts an HTTP server to deliver the JAR to the target, a necessary step in the exploit chain.attacker/exploit.py:151-155attacker/exploit.py:221
Ctf Flag
Payload withheldA CTF flag is placed in the Docker container, indicating the lab environment is a capture-the-flag exercise.Dockerfile:19
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • The evidence packet includes only 4 of 9 files from the repository; 5 files are omitted with no content provided. The omitted files may contain additional context, but the included files are sufficient for classification.
  • The analysis is based solely on static review of the provided source code; the code was not executed, and its operational reliability is not verified.
  • 5 text files were omitted from the evidence packet and were not reviewed; their content could contain additional behavior.
  • No binary files were present, but the evidence policy flags binary content as metadata-only and not analyzed.
  • The review is limited to the supplied text content and does not include dynamic analysis or execution of the exploit.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2026-20896

Repository PoCStars: 1Created 2026-07-29
ExploitCVE-2026-208964 files

7.9 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

The artifact is a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-20896. It includes a Dockerfile that sets up a vulnerable Gitea instance and a Python script (poc.py) that sends an HTTP request with a forged payload withheld header to bypass authentication and access a private repository, confirming the vulnerability.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The repository contains a proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-20896, a Gitea authentication bypass. The Dockerfile sets up a vulnerable Gitea instance and creates a private proof repository. The Python script (poc.py) sends HTTP requests with a forged payload withheld header to demonstrate the bypass. All code is plaintext and directly related to demonstrating the stated vulnerability. No concealed executable behavior, persistence, credential exfiltration, or unrelated payloads were observed.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence98%
AuthenticationNot required
LanguagesDockerfileMarkdownPython
Target softwareGitea
Attack typesauthentication bypassprivilege escalation
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The artifact contains code that actively exploits the vulnerability by sending a crafted request to bypass authentication and access a protected resource. The Python script (poc.py) is designed to exercise the vulnerability, not merely detect it, and the README describes it as a 'PoC' that demonstrates the bypass.

README.md:1README.md:40-42poc.py:1-5poc.py:68-94

Requirements

  • A running Gitea instance with reverse-proxy authentication enabled and REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES set to '*'.README.md:10
  • The attacker must be able to reach the Gitea backend directly or through a proxy that preserves the payload withheld header.README.md:22

Observed behavior

  • The Dockerfile builds a Gitea 1.26.2 image with reverse-proxy authentication enabled and creates an admin user and a private repository containing a proof file.Dockerfile:3-9Dockerfile:26-32
  • The Python script sends an HTTP GET request to the private proof file with the header 'payload withheld: gitea-admin' and checks if the response status is 200 and the body matches the expected proof string.poc.py:29-32poc.py:72-74poc.py:84-89
  • If the bypass is successful, the script prints 'VULNERABLE' and the proof string, demonstrating unauthorized access to the private repository.poc.py:91-94
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Url
Payload withheldTarget URL used by the PoC to interact with the local Gitea instance.poc.py:56
Http Header
Payload withheldThe header used to demonstrate the authentication bypass.poc.py:32
String
Payload withheldExpected proof string stored in the private repository to confirm successful exploitation.poc.py:20
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • One file (total 4) is omitted from the packet; its content is not provided, but the packet reports it as a text file without content. The analysis is based on the three provided files.
  • One file (metadata only) was omitted from text analysis; its content was not reviewed.
  • Binary content was not analyzed; the review is limited to the supplied text evidence.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2026-49975

Repository PoCStars: 14Created 2026-06-10
ExploitCVE-2026-499754 files

17.2 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

The artifact is a Python script (poc.py) that implements a denial-of-service exploit against Apache HTTP Server's mod_http2. It crafts HPACK-encoded HTTP/2 requests with many cookie header references, causing excessive memory allocation during cookie merging, and uses flow control to keep connections open and memory unreleased.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The repository contains a proof-of-concept (PoC) for payload withheld, a denial-of-service vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server. The supplied text files (Dockerfile, README.md, poc.py) describe and implement a legitimate HTTP/2 HPACK cookie bomb attack against a vulnerable Apache server. No backdoor, trojan, or deceptive payload targeting the person running the PoC was observed. The code performs only the documented DoS attack and standard HTTP/2 connection handling.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence98%
AuthenticationNot required
LanguagesPython
Target softwareApache HTTP Servermod_http2
Attack typesDenial of ServiceMemory Exhaustion
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The primary artifact poc.py contains code that actively exercises the vulnerability by sending malicious HTTP/2 requests to cause memory exhaustion and denial of service. It is not merely detecting or reporting the vulnerability; it is exploiting it.

poc.py:1-365README.md:45-71

Requirements

  • Target must be running a vulnerable version of Apache HTTP Server (2.4.17 through 2.4.67) with mod_http2 enabled and h2c direct mode configured.README.md:24-25Dockerfile:1-14
  • Network access to the target HTTP/2 service.poc.py:204-205

Observed behavior

  • Establishes multiple HTTP/2 connections using h2c direct mode.poc.py:204-221
  • Sends HPACK-encoded header blocks that expand into many cookie header fields on the server, causing repeated memory allocation during cookie merging.poc.py:76-90poc.py:257-258
  • Uses HTTP/2 flow control (initial window size of 0 and periodic small window updates) to delay response transmission, keeping streams open and preventing memory release.poc.py:92-94poc.py:229-240poc.py:286-303
  • Maintains connections for a configurable hold duration to sustain memory pressure.poc.py:286-303
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Vulnerability Exploit
Payload withheldThe PoC targets a known Apache HTTP Server DoS vulnerability via HTTP/2 HPACK cookie header amplification.README.md:12-15poc.py:75-90
Network Behavior
Payload withheldThe PoC connects to a user-supplied target to send the DoS payload. This is expected exploit behavior, not a backdoor.poc.py:204-221poc.py:244-249
Command Line Interface
Payload withheldThe README instructs the user to run the PoC against a target server. No hidden or deceptive commands are present.README.md:61-70
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • One file (likely a video or image referenced in README.md) was omitted from the text evidence; its content is not available for analysis.
  • The evidence does not include the actual execution output or confirmation that the exploit was successfully run against a live target.
  • One binary file (user-attachments/assets/89310771-f704-45d1-a6c3-d910de1dbc74) was flagged as metadata-only and not analyzed. It is referenced as an image in the README and is not executed by the PoC.
  • The review covers only the supplied text evidence; no runtime analysis was performed.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2026-26980

Repository PoCStars: 3Created 2026-05-27
ExploitCVE-2026-269808 files

352.2 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

The artifact is a Python script (poc.py) that exploits CVE-2026-26980, an unauthenticated SQL injection in Ghost CMS Content API, to perform boolean-based blind data extraction from the database. It recovers admin email, name, API key ID, and secret, and enumerates table row counts.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The supplied evidence consists of a Dockerfile, README.md, and poc.py for a public CVE-2026-26980 SQL injection proof-of-concept. The PoC demonstrates a boolean-based blind SQL injection against a vulnerable Ghost CMS instance to extract database metadata and API key material. No backdoor, trojan, or deceptive payload targeting the person running the PoC was observed. The code performs only the advertised exploit behavior against the specified target URL.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence98%
AuthenticationNot required
LanguagesPython
Target softwareGhost CMS
Attack typesSQL Injection
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The Python script `poc.py` actively constructs and sends SQL injection payloads to a vulnerable Ghost CMS instance to extract sensitive data (admin credentials, API secrets) and enumerate database contents. This constitutes exploitation, not mere detection or scanning. The README describes it as a 'PoC' that 'demonstrates how a public Content API request can be turned into a boolean-based database read primitive' and the code performs the actual data extraction.

poc.py:1-237README.md:16README.md:129

Requirements

  • A target Ghost CMS instance vulnerable to CVE-2026-26980 (versions >= 3.24.0, < 6.19.1) with a known public Content API key.README.md:14README.md:22-24poc.py:7
  • The target must have two oracle tags named 'bacon' and 'chorizo' seeded in the database for the boolean-based extraction to function.README.md:155-158poc.py:30poc.py:176

Observed behavior

  • Sends HTTP GET requests to the Ghost Content API endpoint `/ghost/api/content/tags/` with a crafted `filter` parameter containing a SQL injection payload in the `slug:[...]` filter.poc.py:15-18poc.py:21-30
  • Uses a boolean-based blind SQL injection technique: the order of the returned tags ('bacon' first vs 'chorizo' first) reveals whether an injected SQL condition is true or false.poc.py:33-42README.md:155-158
  • Extracts database values character by character using a prefix-based GLOB search, recovering admin email, admin name, admin API key ID, and admin API secret.poc.py:45-80poc.py:210-213
  • Enumerates row counts for multiple database tables (settings, users, api_keys, posts, tags, posts_tags) using the same boolean oracle.poc.py:101-118poc.py:202-206
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Exploit Behavior
Payload withheldThis is the normal, advertised exploit behavior for CVE-2026-26980 and does not constitute a backdoor.poc.py:1-237
Network Target
Payload withheldThe target is explicitly provided by the user; the script does not contain hardcoded exfiltration to an attacker-controlled server.poc.py:170
Hardcoded Credential
Payload withheldThis is a lab-specific Content API key used for the demonstration; it is not a backdoor credential and is documented in the README.poc.py:7README.md:55-56
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • The evidence packet includes only three text files (Dockerfile, README.md, poc.py) out of eight total files; two non-text media files and three additional text files are omitted, so the full repository content is not available for review.
  • The analysis is based solely on static source code review; the code was not executed, and its behavior is inferred from the provided text.
  • Five files in the repository were not included in the text evidence: docker-entrypoint.sh, patch-source-theme.sh, and two PNG assets (eqst01.png, work-mode.png) were reported as non-text media or omitted text files. Their content was not reviewed.
  • The analysis is limited to static review of the provided text; the code was not executed, and no dynamic behavior was observed.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2026-42048

Repository PoCStars: 2Created 2026-05-21
ExploitCVE-2026-420486 files

17.4 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

The artifact contains a Python script (poc.py) that sends a crafted DELETE request to the vulnerable Langflow Knowledge Bases API endpoint to trigger arbitrary directory deletion via path traversal. The README describes the vulnerability and provides both the script and a curl command to perform the deletion.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The supplied evidence consists of a Dockerfile, README.md, and poc.py for a CVE-2026-42048 proof-of-concept. The PoC demonstrates a path traversal vulnerability in Langflow by sending a crafted DELETE request to delete a target directory. No backdoor, trojan, or deceptive behavior was observed. The code performs only the advertised exploit action and contains no concealed payloads, persistence mechanisms, or unrelated remote access.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence95%
AuthenticationRequired
LanguagesPythonShellDockerfile
Target softwareLangflow
Attack typesPath TraversalArbitrary Directory Deletion
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The primary artifact is poc.py, which is explicitly designed to send a malicious request to the vulnerable endpoint to delete an arbitrary directory. This constitutes exploit code because it exercises the vulnerability to cause the intended harmful effect (directory deletion), not merely detect or report exposure.

poc.py:1-72README.md:2README.md:68-71

Requirements

  • The target must be running a vulnerable Langflow version (< 1.9.0).README.md:23
  • The attacker must be authenticated or able to make authenticated API requests (low privileges).README.md:30
  • The attacker must be able to reach the DELETE /api/v1/knowledge_bases endpoint.README.md:24-28
  • The Langflow process must have filesystem permissions to delete the target directory.README.md:32

Observed behavior

  • The poc.py script constructs a JSON payload with a user-supplied path in the kb_names array and sends it as a DELETE request to /api/v1/knowledge_bases.poc.py:33-39
  • The script prints the HTTP status and response body after sending the request.poc.py:60-69
  • The README provides a curl command that performs the same DELETE request to delete the payload withheld directory.README.md:80-84
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Exploit Behavior
Payload withheldThe PoC sends a DELETE request to the vulnerable endpoint to delete a directory outside the intended Knowledge Base storage. This matches the described CVE-2026-42048 vulnerability.poc.py:32-42README.md:80-84
Target Directory
Payload withheldThe lab setup creates a disposable target directory for the PoC to delete. The Dockerfile sets CHALLENGE_TARGET_DIR and the PoC defaults to this path.Dockerfile:18poc.py:9
Authentication Requirement
Payload withheldThe README states that exploitation requires an authenticated attacker. The PoC does not include credential theft or authentication bypass; it assumes the user is already authenticated.README.md:30
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • The evidence does not include the challenge-proxy.py, docker-entrypoint.sh, or flag.txt files, which are part of the lab setup but not the exploit logic.
  • The analysis is based solely on static review of the provided text files; the code was not executed, and its actual behavior in a live environment is not verified.
  • Three additional files (challenge-proxy.py, flag.txt, docker-entrypoint.sh) were present in the repository but not included in the text evidence. Their content was not reviewed. The analysis scope states these were omitted due to text selection rules, not because they were flagged as binary. If these files contained backdoor behavior, it would not be detected in this review.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2026-40897

Repository PoCStars: 2Created 2026-05-07
ExploitCVE-2026-408974 files

66.7 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

The artifact is a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-40897, a sandbox bypass leading to remote code execution in the Math.js expression parser. It includes a vulnerable Node.js server (server.js) that evaluates user-supplied expressions via math.evaluate, a Dockerfile to build the vulnerable environment, and a README.md with step-by-step instructions to achieve a reverse shell by submitting a crafted expression that overwrites ArrayNode's internal .map to access Function.constructor.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The supplied evidence consists of a Dockerfile, a README.md, and a server.js file that together demonstrate a proof-of-concept (PoC) for CVE-2026-40897, a sandbox bypass leading to remote code execution in Math.js. The server.js file implements a simple HTTP server that accepts mathematical expressions and evaluates them using a vulnerable version of Math.js (15.1.0). The README.md describes the vulnerability and provides a payload that exploits the expression parser to achieve reverse shell access. All observed behavior is consistent with the stated purpose of demonstrating the CVE. No concealed executable behavior, unrelated payloads, persistence mechanisms, credential theft, or other backdoor functionality was found in the reviewed text files.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence95%
AuthenticationNot required
Languagesjavascriptmarkdowndockerfile
Target softwaremathjs
Attack typesremote code executionsandbox bypassprototype pollution
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The artifact contains a complete, executable exploit chain: a vulnerable server (server.js) that evaluates user input, a Dockerfile to reproduce the vulnerable environment, and a README with a specific payload and instructions to achieve a reverse shell. The payload is designed to exercise the vulnerability by overwriting internal object properties to execute arbitrary code, which is the definition of an exploit.

README.md:14-15README.md:44-61server.js:19-21

Requirements

  • A vulnerable Math.js version (13.1.1 to 15.1.1) must be installed and used to evaluate user-controlled expressions.Dockerfile:3README.md:23
  • The application must pass untrusted user input directly to math.evaluate without additional sanitization.server.js:19-21README.md:70
  • The attacker must have network access to the vulnerable server and a listener for the reverse shell.README.md:47-50

Observed behavior

  • The server.js file creates an HTTP server that accepts POST requests to /calculate, parses a JSON body containing an 'expr' field, splits it by newline, and passes the resulting array directly to math.evaluate.server.js:13-21
  • The README.md provides a multi-line JavaScript payload that uses reviver to obtain an ArrayNode, overwrites its .map property with a function that returns Function.constructor, and then uses a FunctionAssignmentNode to trigger internal code that calls the overwritten .map, ultimately executing a reverse shell command.README.md:54-61
  • The Dockerfile builds a container with Math.js version 15.1.0 (vulnerable), copies the server.js, and creates a flag file to demonstrate file system access after exploitation.Dockerfile:1-6
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Vulnerable Dependency
Payload withheldThe Dockerfile installs a version of Math.js known to be vulnerable to CVE-2026-40897, which is the subject of the PoC.Dockerfile:3
Exploit Payload
Payload withheldThe README.md provides a multi-line expression that exploits the Math.js parser to achieve arbitrary code execution, consistent with the described CVE.README.md:55-60
Network Service
Payload withheldThe server.js file implements the vulnerable endpoint that evaluates user-supplied expressions, which is the attack surface for the PoC.server.js:13-21
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • The evidence includes one non-text media file (an image in the README) that was not analyzed; its content is not required for classification.
  • The artifact's behavior is inferred from static code analysis and documentation; the code was not executed, and the exploit's reliability is not verified.
  • One non-text media file (a PNG image embedded in server.js as a base64 data URI) was not analyzed; it appears to be a team logo and is unlikely to contain executable code.
  • The review is limited to the static source code and documentation; runtime behavior or network interactions were not observed.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2026-34220

Repository PoCStars: 0Created 2026-04-27
ExploitCVE-2026-342205 files

122.6 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

The artifact provides a complete, runnable Node.js application (app.js) that intentionally includes a vulnerable custom MikroORM type (JsonOrRawType) and exposes API endpoints. The README.md provides explicit curl commands to send a malicious JSON payload containing a `__raw` property with attacker-controlled SQL, which the application will execute, exfiltrating data from an unrelated table. This constitutes a fully functional exploit environment and proof-of-concept.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The repository contains a proof-of-concept (PoC) for CVE-2026-34220, a SQL injection vulnerability in MikroORM. The code sets up a vulnerable Express application with a custom column type that passes attacker-controlled objects containing a `__raw` property directly into SQL queries. The README documents the vulnerability and provides a curl command to trigger it. No backdoor, trojan, or deceptive behavior targeting the person running the PoC was observed. The application's behavior is consistent with demonstrating the described SQL injection vulnerability.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence95%
AuthenticationNot required
LanguagesJavaScriptMarkdown
Target softwareMikroORM
Attack typesSQL Injection
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The artifact includes a complete, runnable vulnerable application and explicit instructions (curl command) to trigger the SQL injection vulnerability, resulting in unauthorized data exfiltration. This is code intended to exercise a vulnerability, meeting the definition of an exploit.

README.md:37-64app.js:1-379

Requirements

  • A running instance of the vulnerable application, which can be built and started using the provided Dockerfile and instructions.README.md:30-33Dockerfile:1-12

Observed behavior

  • The application defines a custom MikroORM type `JsonOrRawType` that passes objects with a `__raw` property directly to the database without sanitization.app.js:11-17
  • The `/api/posts` endpoint accepts user-supplied JSON and creates a database entity with the `content` field, which is of the vulnerable custom type.app.js:300-316
  • The README provides a curl command that sends a JSON payload with `"content": { "__raw": true, "sql": "(SELECT group_concat(name || ': ' || salary, ' / ') FROM salaries)" }`, causing the SQL subquery to be executed and its result stored in the post content.README.md:43-53
  • The application seeds a `salaries` table with sensitive data, including a flag string, which the exploit exfiltrates.app.js:54-71
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Vulnerability Demonstration
Payload withheldThis is the core of the demonstrated CVE-2026-34220 SQL injection vulnerability, not a backdoor.app.js:11-17
Sensitive Data Seed
Payload withheldA flag string is seeded into the database as part of the PoC scenario to demonstrate data exfiltration via SQL injection.app.js:70
Poc Instruction
Payload withheldThis is the documented PoC trigger, not a backdoor command.README.md:43-53
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • One file (likely a binary or non-text asset) was omitted from the evidence; its absence does not affect the classification of the provided text files as an exploit.
  • The evidence packet reports complete_artifact_coverage as false, but all readable selected text files are fully included.
  • One file (package-lock.json or similar) was omitted from the text evidence; its content was not reviewed, but it is typically a dependency lock file and unlikely to contain backdoor logic.
  • Binary files were not present in the evidence.
  • The review is limited to the supplied text content and does not include dynamic analysis or execution of the code.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2026-0603

Repository PoCStars: 0Created 2026-04-23
ExploitCVE-2026-060315 files

31.7 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

The artifact is a fully functional web application that demonstrates a second-order SQL injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-0603) in Hibernate ORM. It provides a Dockerized environment and step-by-step instructions to register a user with a malicious username containing an SQL payload, then trigger a bulk update or delete operation that affects all records in the database, not just the attacker's own.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The repository contains a proof-of-concept (PoC) for CVE-2026-0603, a second-order SQL injection in Hibernate ORM. All reviewed source files (Java entities, DTOs, a Spring Boot application, a shell startup script, and a frontend HTML page) implement a simple user management demo with no concealed executable behavior, no persistence mechanisms beyond the demo's own database, and no unrelated remote access or credential theft. The README describes the vulnerability and provides reproduction steps. No backdoor or trojan behavior is observed.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence95%
AuthenticationNot required
LanguagesJavaJavaScriptHTMLShell
Target softwareHibernate ORM
Attack typesSQL Injection
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The artifact includes a complete, runnable application and explicit instructions to perform actions that result in unauthorized mass data modification or deletion. This constitutes exploit code because it is designed to exercise the vulnerability and cause a harmful outcome (mass deletion/modification) beyond mere detection.

README.md:3README.md:38-53

Requirements

  • A running instance of the vulnerable application, which can be started via the provided Docker commands.README.md:31-34
  • The application must be configured to use InlineIdsOrClauseBulkIdStrategy, as indicated in the mitigation section.README.md:58-59

Observed behavior

  • The README instructs the user to register with the malicious username "' or '1' = '1".README.md:42-44
  • The frontend JavaScript code sends the username to the backend via a POST request to /users without any client-side sanitization of SQL metacharacters.app/src/main/resources/static/index.html:324-333
  • The User entity maps the username field as the primary key (Id) and stores it directly from user input.app/src/main/java/com/example/lab/domain/User.java:15-17
  • The README states that triggering an update or delete on the malicious account will cause the SQL payload to be injected into the WHERE clause, affecting all rows.README.md:46-53
  • The frontend provides '정보 변경' (update) and '탈퇴' (delete) buttons for the currently logged-in user, which send PATCH and DELETE requests respectively.app/src/main/resources/static/index.html:310-312app/src/main/resources/static/index.html:364-378
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Vulnerability Demonstration
Payload withheldThe artifact is a legitimate proof-of-concept for a known CVE, demonstrating the vulnerability through a user registration and bulk update/delete flow.README.md:1-65
Application Behavior
Payload withheldThe Java and HTML files implement standard create, read, update, and delete operations on user records, consistent with the described PoC.app/src/main/resources/static/index.html:225-400app/src/main/java/com/example/lab/domain/User.java:1-40
Startup Script
Payload withheldThe script sets up a local database and starts the vulnerable application; no external connections or hidden commands are present.start.sh:1-16
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • The backend controller code (e.g., the REST endpoints handling POST, PATCH, DELETE) is not included in the provided text files, so the exact server-side query construction cannot be verified.
  • The application configuration file (e.g., application.yml) that would confirm the use of InlineIdsOrClauseBulkIdStrategy is not included.
  • The evidence packet reports complete_artifact_coverage as false, indicating that not all files from the repository are present.
  • 7 text files were omitted from the evidence packet due to size constraints; their content was not reviewed.
  • Binary files were not present in the artifact.
  • The review is based solely on static source code analysis; runtime behavior was not observed.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2026-33937

Repository PoCStars: 2Created 2026-04-22
ExploitCVE-2026-339379 files

51.3 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

The artifact contains a Python script (exploit.py) that sends a crafted Handlebars AST payload to a vulnerable server endpoint to achieve remote code execution. It also includes a JSON payload (poc.json) demonstrating the injection technique. The README describes the vulnerability and provides usage instructions for the exploit.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The supplied evidence consists of a README, Dockerfile, Python exploit script, and a JSON payload file for CVE-2026-33937. All files demonstrate a legitimate proof-of-concept for the described Handlebars.js AST injection vulnerability. The exploit script sends a crafted AST to a local server endpoint to achieve remote code execution, which is the expected behavior for a PoC targeting this CVE. No concealed, deceptive, or unrelated harmful behavior (such as credential theft, persistence, or backdoor access) was observed in any of the reviewed text.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence98%
AuthenticationNot required
LanguagesPythonJSONMarkdown
Target softwareHandlebars.js
Attack typesRemote Code ExecutionCode InjectionType Confusion
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The artifact includes a fully functional Python script (exploit.py) that actively exploits CVE-2026-33937 by sending a crafted AST payload to a target server to execute arbitrary commands. This is the primary artifact and its purpose is to exercise the vulnerability, not merely detect it. The README describes it as a 'PoC' and provides instructions for using the exploit.

exploit.py:1-80README.md:6README.md:49-64

Requirements

  • A vulnerable Handlebars.js server (versions 4.0.0 through 4.7.8) must be running and accessible, with an endpoint that passes user-controlled input directly to Handlebars.compile().README.md:76-81

Observed behavior

  • The Python script (exploit.py) establishes an interactive shell that repeatedly prompts the user for a command, constructs a malicious Handlebars AST object with the command injected into a NumberLiteral node's value field, and sends it via HTTP POST to a target server endpoint.exploit.py:12-68
  • The injected payload uses process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync() to execute the supplied command on the server.exploit.py:50-52
  • The script prints the server's response, which is expected to contain the output of the executed command.exploit.py:70-72
  • The poc.json file provides a static example of the AST injection technique using a BooleanLiteral node to execute 'cat /etc/passwd'.poc.json:1-23
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Exploit Payload
Payload withheldThe Python exploit script constructs an AST payload that injects a call to execSync with user-supplied commands, consistent with the documented RCE vulnerability.exploit.py:52
Exploit Payload
Payload withheldThe poc.json file contains a static AST payload that executes 'cat /etc/passwd', demonstrating the same RCE primitive.poc.json:13
Target Endpoint
Payload withheldThe exploit script targets a local server endpoint, which is the intended vulnerable application described in the README.exploit.py:4
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • The evidence packet reports complete_artifact_coverage: false and 5 unclassified files (binary or omitted) are not included in the analysis, so the full repository content is not available.
  • The target URL in exploit.py is hardcoded to 'payload withheld' (line 4) but the README and Dockerfile indicate the application runs on port 12701, suggesting a potential configuration mismatch or that the script is intended for a different deployment.
  • Five files in the repository were not analyzed because they were classified as non-text or binary and only metadata was provided. Their content could not be reviewed.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2026-30951

Repository PoCStars: 1Created 2026-04-05
ExploitCVE-2026-309516 files

125.4 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

The artifact is a fully functional Node.js/Express web application that intentionally exposes a vulnerable Sequelize ORM endpoint. It includes a step-by-step guide to trigger a boolean-based SQL injection by sending a crafted JSON payload with a malicious key containing '::' to the /api/users/search endpoint, which causes the application to return all user rows instead of filtered results.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The repository contains a proof-of-concept (PoC) for CVE-2026-30951, a SQL injection vulnerability in Sequelize. The provided source code (app.js, README.md, Dockerfile, package.json) demonstrates the vulnerability as described in the CVE. No concealed executable behavior, persistence mechanisms, credential theft, or unrelated payloads were observed. The application logic is consistent with a legitimate educational PoC.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence95%
AuthenticationNot required
LanguagesJavaScriptHTMLDockerfile
Target softwareSequelize
Attack typesSQL Injection
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The artifact includes a complete, runnable application (app.js) with a vulnerable endpoint and explicit instructions (README.md) to send a malicious payload that triggers a SQL injection, causing the application to return all database rows. This constitutes code intended to exercise a vulnerability.

README.md:3README.md:59-105app.js:438-467

Requirements

  • The vulnerable application must be running and accessible over the network.README.md:35-57

Observed behavior

  • Sends a crafted JSON POST request with a malicious key 'name::text) or 1=1--' to the /api/users/search endpoint.README.md:80-89
  • The application returns all user rows from the database, confirming the SQL injection altered the query logic.README.md:91-95
  • The vulnerable endpoint passes user-controlled JSON object keys directly into a Sequelize where clause on a JSON column.app.js:460-462
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Vulnerability Demonstration
Payload withheldThe README and app.js code demonstrate the CVE-2026-30951 SQL injection by passing a crafted JSON key to Sequelize's where clause, which is the expected behavior of a PoC for this vulnerability.README.md:80-89app.js:460-466
Flag Definition
Payload withheldA flag is defined for a CTF-style challenge, but it is only stored in the database and never exfiltrated or sent to an external server. The application does not expose the flag through any endpoint.app.js:6app.js:71-73
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • One non-text media file (eqst01.png) was not analyzed.
  • One text file (verify.js) was omitted from the packet content.
  • One non-text media file (eqst01.png) was not analyzed; it is a logo image referenced in the HTML and is unlikely to contain executable code.
  • One text file (verify.js) was omitted from the evidence packet; its content is unknown, but the package.json lists it as a script, and the available code does not reference it in a way that suggests backdoor behavior.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2026-5027

Repository PoCStars: 3Created 2026-04-03
ExploitCVE-2026-50275 files

15.8 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

A Python script that exploits CVE-2026-5027, a path traversal vulnerability in Langflow <= 1.8.4, to achieve arbitrary file write and remote code execution via a cron job reverse shell.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The PoC script CVE-2026-5027.py implements a straightforward path-traversal exploit against the Langflow /api/v2/files endpoint, consistent with the described CVE-2026-5027. It obtains an access token via auto-login or credentials, constructs a traversal filename, and writes attacker-controlled content (a proof file or a cron-based reverse shell) to the target server. No concealed backdoor, unrelated payload, or deceptive behavior targeting the PoC operator was observed. The Dockerfile and README.md provide supporting lab setup and documentation without hidden commands.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence100%
AuthenticationNot required
LanguagesPython
Target softwareLangflow
Attack typespath traversalarbitrary file writeremote code execution
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The primary artifact is a Python script that actively exploits CVE-2026-5027 by performing path traversal to write arbitrary files and establish a reverse shell, which is the definition of exploit code.

CVE-2026-5027.py:1-3CVE-2026-5027.py:125-126CVE-2026-5027.py:144-158

Requirements

  • Target running Langflow <= 1.8.4 with auto-login enabled (default configuration) or valid credentials.CVE-2026-5027.py:10-13CVE-2026-5027.py:79-89
  • Network access to the target's /api/v2/files endpoint.CVE-2026-5027.py:113-114

Observed behavior

  • Obtains an access token via auto-login (unauthenticated) or supplied credentials.CVE-2026-5027.py:79-103
  • Constructs a multipart filename with path traversal sequences ('../' * 9) to escape the intended upload directory.CVE-2026-5027.py:109-110
  • Writes attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary filesystem path via the /api/v2/files endpoint.CVE-2026-5027.py:106-115
  • Deploys a cron job to /etc/cron.d/ that executes a bash reverse shell to the attacker's listener every minute.CVE-2026-5027.py:144-158
  • Writes a proof-of-concept file to /tmp/CVE-2026-5027-proof.txt when no listener is specified.CVE-2026-5027.py:163-175
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Reverse Shell Payload
Payload withheldThe exploit optionally deploys a cron job that executes a reverse shell to attacker-controlled host/port. This is the advertised RCE payload for the target vulnerability, not a backdoor against the PoC operator.CVE-2026-5027.py:147-150
Path Traversal Technique
Payload withheldThe script prepends nine '../' sequences to the user-supplied remote path to escape the upload directory. This is the core exploit mechanism for CVE-2026-5027.CVE-2026-5027.py:109-110
Auto Login Abuse
Payload withheldThe script attempts unauthenticated token retrieval via the auto-login endpoint, matching the vulnerability description for default configurations.CVE-2026-5027.py:82
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • Two files (docker-entrypoint.sh, watch-etc-cron-files.sh) were omitted from the packet and not analyzed.
  • The evidence packet reports complete_artifact_coverage is false, indicating not all repository files were included.
  • Two text files (docker-entrypoint.sh, watch-etc-cron-files.sh) were present in the repository but not included in the evidence packet. Their content could not be reviewed.
  • The analysis scope is limited to the supplied text evidence; no dynamic execution or binary analysis was performed.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2026-33017

Repository PoCStars: 8Created 2026-03-31
ExploitCVE-2026-330174 files

21.5 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

The artifact contains a Python script (exploit.py) that sends a crafted HTTP POST request to the unauthenticated /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{flow_id}/flow endpoint of a vulnerable Langflow instance. The request body includes a malicious custom component with Python code that establishes a reverse shell back to an attacker-controlled listener. The script also includes a built-in listener to receive the shell.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The PoC demonstrates the documented CVE-2026-33017 vulnerability by sending a crafted request to the vulnerable endpoint. The exploit.py script builds a payload containing a reverse shell, which is the expected exploit behavior for an RCE PoC. No concealed backdoor, unrelated payload, persistence mechanism, or operator-directed harm beyond the stated exploit was observed.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence100%
AuthenticationNot required
LanguagesPythonMarkdown
Target softwareLangflow
Attack typesRemote Code ExecutionCode InjectionEval Injection
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The artifact includes a complete, functional Python script (exploit.py) that actively exploits CVE-2026-33017 by sending a crafted request to execute arbitrary code and establish a reverse shell on the target server. This is code intended to exercise a vulnerability, not merely detect or report it.

exploit.py:1-130README.md:107-109

Requirements

  • A running, vulnerable Langflow instance (prior to 1.9.0) with a public flow ID.README.md:11-16README.md:22
  • An attacker-controlled listener (netcat or the script's built-in listener) to receive the reverse shell.README.md:27-31

Observed behavior

  • The exploit script constructs a JSON payload containing a custom component with embedded Python code that imports socket and subprocess, connects to a specified IP and port, and spawns an interactive bash shell.exploit.py:9-24
  • The script sends an unauthenticated POST request to the target endpoint with the malicious payload.exploit.py:108-117
  • The script optionally starts a built-in TCP listener to catch the reverse shell and provides an interactive command interface.exploit.py:56-87
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Reverse Shell
Payload withheldThis is the core exploit payload for the documented RCE vulnerability. It is not a hidden backdoor; it is the intended demonstration of the CVE.exploit.py:18-22README.md:141
Listener
Payload withheldThis is a convenience feature for the PoC user, not a backdoor. It simply receives the reverse shell connection initiated by the exploit payload.exploit.py:56-87
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • The evidence packet reports complete_artifact_coverage as false and one file (entrypoint.sh) is omitted from the text content, but the exploit logic is fully present in the provided files.
  • One file (entrypoint.sh) was omitted from the text evidence and was not reviewed. Its metadata was present but content was not supplied.
  • Binary files were not present in the evidence.
  • The review is limited to the supplied text content and does not include dynamic analysis or execution.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2026-21858

Repository PoCStars: 1Created 2026-02-11
ExploitCVE-2026-218586 files

11.3 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

A Python script (poc.py) that exploits CVE-2026-21858 in n8n 1.120.4. It first extracts sensitive assets (encryption key, admin credentials) via an unauthenticated form-based file read, then uses those credentials to authenticate and achieve remote code execution by creating and running a workflow containing an Execute Command node.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The PoC demonstrates the CVE-2026-21858 vulnerability by extracting n8n configuration and database files, then using recovered credentials to execute arbitrary commands via the n8n REST API. All observed behavior is consistent with a legitimate proof-of-concept exploit for the stated CVE. No concealed payload, persistence mechanism, credential exfiltration to an external party, or unrelated backdoor functionality was found.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence100%
AuthenticationNot required
LanguagesPythonDockerfileBatchfile
Target softwaren8n
Attack typesRemote Code ExecutionInformation DisclosureAuthentication Bypass
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The artifact contains a complete, functional exploit script (poc.py) that actively exercises the vulnerability to achieve remote code execution, not merely detect or report it. The README explicitly describes it as a 'PoC script' and 'exploit script' that provides an interactive shell.

README.md:3README.md:13README.md:50-53poc.py:127-170

Requirements

  • A vulnerable n8n instance (version 1.120.4) with a Form Trigger workflow activated and its URL known.README.md:3README.md:29-34
  • Python 3.x with dependencies (requests, PyJWT) installed on the attacker's machine.README.md:7README.md:39-41

Observed behavior

  • Reads arbitrary files from the n8n server by sending a crafted POST request to the Form Trigger URL with a 'files' payload containing a target filepath.poc.py:34-66
  • Extracts the encryption key from /home/n8n/.n8n/config and derives the FINAL_SECRET_KEY.poc.py:75-80
  • Extracts admin credentials (email, bcrypt hash, UUID) from /home/n8n/.n8n/database.sqlite.poc.py:82-98
  • Generates a forged JWT authentication token using the extracted secret and admin credentials, then sets session headers and cookies.poc.py:112-124
  • Creates a new n8n workflow containing an 'Execute Command' node with an attacker-supplied command, runs it, and retrieves the command output, achieving remote code execution.poc.py:127-170
  • Provides an interactive shell prompt ('n8n-shell>') for repeated command execution.poc.py:178-183
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Credential Extraction
Payload withheldThe PoC reads sensitive n8n configuration files to derive a JWT secret and admin credentials, which are then used to authenticate to the n8n API for command execution. This is the core of the CVE-2026-21858 exploit.poc.py:75-110
Command Execution
Payload withheldAfter extracting credentials, the script creates a new workflow containing an Execute Command node and runs it, retrieving the output. This demonstrates the RCE impact of the vulnerability.poc.py:127-170
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • Two files (requirements.txt, workflow.txt) are reported in the inventory but their content is not included in the evidence packet.
  • The evidence packet reports complete_artifact_coverage as false, indicating not all files from the repository snapshot are present.
  • Two files (workflow.txt and requirements.txt) were omitted from the text evidence; their content is not reviewed. The workflow.txt file is referenced in the README for setting up the vulnerable environment, and requirements.txt lists Python dependencies. Neither is expected to contain executable backdoor logic, but their absence is a minor evidence gap.
  • The review is limited to static analysis of the provided text; no dynamic execution was performed.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2025-55182

Repository PoCStars: 1Created 2025-12-16
Not analyzedCVE-2025-5518221 files
GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2025-3248

Repository PoCStars: 2Created 2025-09-15
ExploitCVE-2025-32482 files

7.6 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

Python script that sends a crafted POST request to the /api/v1/validate/code endpoint of a Langflow instance to achieve remote code execution via a code injection vulnerability (CVE-2025-3248).

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The PoC is a straightforward Python script that sends a crafted payload to the vulnerable /api/v1/validate/code endpoint of a Langflow instance to achieve remote code execution, consistent with the described CVE-2025-3248. No concealed backdoor, unrelated payload, persistence mechanism, or credential theft was observed. The script's behavior is limited to executing the user-supplied command on the target server and printing the output.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence95%
AuthenticationNot required
LanguagesPython
Target softwareLangflow
Attack typescode injectionremote code execution
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The script actively sends a payload designed to execute arbitrary commands on the target system and retrieves the output, which constitutes exploitation rather than mere detection or scanning.

CVE-2025-3248.py:67-105CVE-2025-3248.py:2

Requirements

  • Target must be a Langflow instance version < 1.3.0 with the /api/v1/validate/code endpoint exposed.CVE-2025-3248.py:69README.md:15
  • Attacker must be able to reach the target over HTTP(S).CVE-2025-3248.py:84-85

Observed behavior

  • Constructs a JSON payload containing a Python function definition with a default argument that executes a shell command via subprocess.check_output.CVE-2025-3248.py:72-80
  • Sends an HTTP POST request with the payload to the target's /api/v1/validate/code endpoint.CVE-2025-3248.py:84-85
  • Parses the JSON response to extract command output from error messages.CVE-2025-3248.py:95-102
  • Prints the extracted command output to stdout.CVE-2025-3248.py:119-121
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Exploit Mechanism
Payload withheldThe payload constructs a Python function definition where the default argument value calls exec() with a subprocess command, exploiting the code validation endpoint to achieve RCE.CVE-2025-3248.py:74
Network Target
Payload withheldThe script sends a POST request to the vulnerable endpoint with the malicious payload.CVE-2025-3248.py:69CVE-2025-3248.py:84-85
Command Execution
Payload withheldThe script takes a command from the command line and injects it into the payload, which is then executed on the target server.CVE-2025-3248.py:74CVE-2025-3248.py:111-116
Output Handling
Payload withheldThe script parses the JSON error response from the server to retrieve the output of the executed command.CVE-2025-3248.py:95-102
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • Evidence consists solely of source code and documentation; no runtime output, network traffic, or target interaction was observed.
  • The README disclaimer states the repository is not intended to be an RCE exploit, but the code behavior matches exploitation.
  • Review is limited to the supplied text files (CVE-2025-3248.py and README.md). No binary files were present or analyzed. The script's runtime behavior was not dynamically executed or tested.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2025-26788

Repository PoCStars: 1Created 2025-08-18
StubCVE-2025-267882 files

2.8 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

The artifact contains only a Dockerfile and a setup script for installing StrongKey FIDO Server v4.15.0. There is no exploit, scanner, or technical analysis code related to CVE-2025-26788.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The repository contains a Dockerfile and a setup script for StrongKey FIDO Server. The script downloads official v4.15.0 distribution archives from SourceForge, installs system packages, and deploys a sample application. No backdoor, concealed payload, or operator-directed harm is observed.

ClassificationStub
Model confidence95%
AuthenticationUnknown
LanguagesDockerfileShell
Target softwareStrongKey FIDO Server
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The repository contains only a Dockerfile and a shell script that installs the vulnerable software version. There is no code that exercises, detects, or analyzes the CVE-2025-26788 vulnerability. The artifact is a placeholder setup environment, not a PoC.

dockerfile:1-21setup-skfs.sh:1-73

Observed behavior

  • Builds a Rocky Linux 9.3 container with systemd.dockerfile:1-21
  • Downloads and installs StrongKey FIDO Server v4.15.0 and a sample application.setup-skfs.sh:1-73
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Download Source
Payload withheldThe setup script downloads the official StrongKey FIDO Server distribution from SourceForge.setup-skfs.sh:36
Download Source
Payload withheldThe setup script downloads a sample application WAR from the official StrongKey project on SourceForge.setup-skfs.sh:61
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • Evidence is limited to two files: a Dockerfile and a setup script. No other files were provided, but the packet reports complete_artifact_coverage, indicating the repository contains only these files.
  • Only the two text files (Dockerfile and setup-skfs.sh) were reviewed. The downloaded archives (fido2server-v4.15.0-dist.tgz, basicdemo.war) are not included in the evidence and were not analyzed.
  • The review is limited to static analysis of the provided text; no dynamic execution or verification of the downloaded binaries was performed.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2025-29927

Repository PoCStars: 2Created 2025-04-25
Not analyzedCVE-2025-2992728 files
GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2025-1302

Repository PoCStars: 21Created 2025-02-25
Not analyzedCVE-2025-130222 files
GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2024-53677

Repository PoCStars: 5Created 2025-01-03
Not analyzedCVE-2024-46538CVE-2024-5367721 files
GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2024-46538

Repository PoCStars: 51Created 2024-10-23
Not analyzedCVE-2024-4653816 files
GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2024-48914

Repository PoCStars: 5Created 2024-10-21
Not analyzedCVE-2024-489147 files
GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2024-8353

Repository PoCStars: 12Created 2024-09-30
Not analyzedCVE-2024-835317 files
GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2024-9014

Repository PoCStars: 8Created 2024-09-26
Not analyzedCVE-2024-90143 files
GitHub

EQSTLab/CVE-2024-25503

Repository PoCStars: 0Created 2024-09-06
Not analyzedCVE-2024-255032 files