farazsth98

4 exploits Active since Mar 2021
CVE-2025-38352 NOMISEC HIGH WORKING POC
Linux Kernel < 5.4.295 - TOCTOU Race Condition
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: posix-cpu-timers: fix race between handle_posix_cpu_timers() and posix_cpu_timer_del() If an exiting non-autoreaping task has already passed exit_notify() and calls handle_posix_cpu_timers() from IRQ, it can be reaped by its parent or debugger right after unlock_task_sighand(). If a concurrent posix_cpu_timer_del() runs at that moment, it won't be able to detect timer->it.cpu.firing != 0: cpu_timer_task_rcu() and/or lock_task_sighand() will fail. Add the tsk->exit_state check into run_posix_cpu_timers() to fix this. This fix is not needed if CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=y, because exit_task_work() is called before exit_notify(). But the check still makes sense, task_work_add(&tsk->posix_cputimers_work.work) will fail anyway in this case.
273 stars
CVSS 7.4
CVE-2025-38352 NOMISEC HIGH WORKING POC
Linux Kernel < 5.4.295 - TOCTOU Race Condition
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: posix-cpu-timers: fix race between handle_posix_cpu_timers() and posix_cpu_timer_del() If an exiting non-autoreaping task has already passed exit_notify() and calls handle_posix_cpu_timers() from IRQ, it can be reaped by its parent or debugger right after unlock_task_sighand(). If a concurrent posix_cpu_timer_del() runs at that moment, it won't be able to detect timer->it.cpu.firing != 0: cpu_timer_task_rcu() and/or lock_task_sighand() will fail. Add the tsk->exit_state check into run_posix_cpu_timers() to fix this. This fix is not needed if CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=y, because exit_task_work() is called before exit_notify(). But the check still makes sense, task_work_add(&tsk->posix_cputimers_work.work) will fail anyway in this case.
91 stars
CVSS 7.4
CVE-2025-39946 GITHUB CRITICAL c WORKING POC
Linux kernel - Info Disclosure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus Normally we wait for the socket to buffer up the whole record before we service it. If the socket has a tiny buffer, however, we read out the data sooner, to prevent connection stalls. Make sure that we abort the connection when we find out late that the record is actually invalid. Retrying the parsing is fine in itself but since we copy some more data each time before we parse we can overflow the allocated skb space. Constructing a scenario in which we're under pressure without enough data in the socket to parse the length upfront is quite hard. syzbot figured out a way to do this by serving us the header in small OOB sends, and then filling in the recvbuf with a large normal send. Make sure that tls_rx_msg_size() aborts strp, if we reach an invalid record there's really no way to recover.
33 stars
CVSS 9.8
CVE-2020-25578 NOMISEC MEDIUM WORKING POC
FreeBSD <12.2-STABLE r368969, 11.4-STABLE r369047, 12.2-RELEASE p3,...
In FreeBSD 12.2-STABLE before r368969, 11.4-STABLE before r369047, 12.2-RELEASE before p3, 12.1-RELEASE before p13 and 11.4-RELEASE before p7 several file systems were not properly initializing the d_off field of the dirent structures returned by VOP_READDIR. In particular, tmpfs(5), smbfs(5), autofs(5) and mqueuefs(5) were failing to do so. As a result, eight uninitialized kernel stack bytes may be leaked to userspace by these file systems.
6 stars
CVSS 5.3