tonghuaroot

2 exploits Active since Jun 2026
CVE-2026-49293 WRITEUP HIGH WRITEUP
CPU exhaustion via O(n^2) BigInt construction on radix-prefixed integer literals
js-toml is a TOML parser for JavaScript, fully compliant with the TOML 1.0.0 Spec. Versions up to and including 1.1.0 parse hexadecimal / octal / binary integer literals via a hand-written `parseBigInt` loop that multiplies a `BigInt` accumulator by the radix once per input digit. Each iteration performs a `BigInt * BigInt` operation on an accumulator that grows linearly with the number of digits already consumed, so the whole loop is O(n²) in the literal length. The lexer regex places no upper bound on the literal length, so a single TOML document containing one ~500 kB hex literal pins one CPU core for ~40 seconds on a modern laptop (Apple M-series, Node v22). Memory amplification is bounded but CPU amplification is severe and grows quadratically: doubling the literal length quadruples the work. A caller that invokes `load()` on attacker-controlled TOML (configuration upload endpoints, CI/CD systems ingesting third-party `*.toml`, IDE plugins, build tools) is exposed to a single-request CPU exhaustion DoS. Version 1.1.1 fixes the issue.
CVSS 7.5
CVE-2026-49336 WRITEUP MEDIUM WRITEUP
@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary: Bearer token and Cookie leak across origin on redirect due to case-mismatched scrub in fetchRequestAdapter
@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary provides TypeScript libraries for Kiota-generated API clients. In versions 1.0.0-preview.97 through 1.0.0-preview.101, `@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary`'s `RedirectHandler` is documented as stripping `Authorization` and `Cookie` from cross-origin redirect targets, but the default `scrubSensitiveHeaders` callback in `RedirectHandlerOptions` uses case-sensitive property deletion (`delete headers.Authorization`, `delete headers.Cookie`) on a headers object that `FetchRequestAdapter.getRequestFromRequestInformation` has already lower-cased. The delete therefore targets keys that do not exist, the scrub is a no-op, and any Bearer token or Cookie attached by a kiota-generated SDK is forwarded to an attacker-controlled host across a 30x redirect. This is reachable in the default middleware chain (`MiddlewareFactory.getDefaultMiddlewares`) with no custom configuration, and applies to every kiota-generated TypeScript SDK that uses `BaseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider` or any other authentication provider that sets the `Authorization` request header. Version 1.0.0-preview.102 patches the issue.