Technical assessment
The artifact contains Python scripts that exploit CVE-2026-2749, a path traversal vulnerability in Centreon Open Tickets. The primary script (poc.py) authenticates, uploads a PHP webshell via a path traversal in the uniqId parameter, executes commands to achieve RCE, and cleans up. A second script (poc_vector2.py) demonstrates arbitrary file deletion via the same traversal. A third script (poc_vector3.py) tests an alternative traversal vector via the filename, which is not exploitable.
Backdoor review
No backdoor observed in reviewed code
The supplied PoC for CVE-2026-2749 is a straightforward path traversal exploit against Centreon Open Tickets. All three Python scripts (poc.py, poc_vector2.py, poc_vector3.py) use only the Python standard library to send HTTP requests to a user-specified target, upload a webshell or canary file, and clean up. No network connections are made to any third-party server, no data is exfiltrated, and no hidden or deceptive functionality is present. The behavior is fully consistent with the documented exploit chain.
Model confidence100%
AuthenticationRequired
Languagespython
Target softwareCentreon Open Tickets
Attack typespath traversalremote code executionarbitrary file deletion
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidenceClassification basis and observed behavior
Classification basis
The primary artifact is poc.py, which is explicitly designed to exploit CVE-2026-2749 by uploading a webshell and executing commands, achieving remote code execution. The README and verification report confirm successful exploitation. The code's stated purpose is to exercise the vulnerability, not merely detect it.
poc/poc.py:1-17poc/poc.py:18-41poc/poc.py:314-350poc_verification_report.md:1-10poc_verification_report.md:79-127Requirements
- Target running Centreon Open Tickets < 25.10.3 / < 24.10.8 / < 24.04.7
poc/poc.py:33-34 - Valid Centreon user credentials (any privilege level)
poc/poc.py:34 - Python 3.6+ (stdlib only, no external dependencies)
poc/poc.py:35
Observed behavior
- Authenticates to Centreon via POST to /centreon/login.php and extracts PHPSESSID cookie
poc/poc.py:153-186 - Uploads a PHP webshell via path traversal in the uniqId parameter of a multipart POST to call.php?action=upload-file
poc/poc.py:188-243 - Executes arbitrary commands (id, whoami, uname -a, cat /etc/hostname) via the uploaded webshell to prove RCE
poc/poc.py:245-280 - Cleans up by deleting the webshell via a path traversal in the remove-file action
poc/poc.py:282-312 - Demonstrates arbitrary file deletion by creating a canary file via upload traversal and deleting it via remove-file traversal
poc/poc_vector2.py:133-180
Safety-review evidenceBehaviors behind the backdoor verdict
Observables
- Network Target
- User-supplied host and port (default 172.22.0.3:80)All scripts connect exclusively to the target specified by the operator via command-line arguments or hardcoded defaults, which is the disclosed vulnerable Centreon instance.
poc/poc.py:354-355poc/poc_vector2.py:231-232poc/poc_vector3.py:236-237 - Webshell Payload
- <?php echo "CVE-2026-2749-RCE:" . shell_exec($_GET["cmd"]); ?>The webshell is uploaded to the target Centreon server as part of the disclosed RCE exploit. It is executed on the target, not the operator's machine.
poc/poc.py:69 - Credential Usage
- admin:Centreon!2021Hardcoded default credentials used to authenticate to the target Centreon instance. These are standard lab credentials documented in the README and not used to access any external service.
poc/poc.py:61-62README.md:118
Review boundariesWhat the analysis did not establish
- Evidence includes only selected text files; 11 unclassified files and 1 non-text media file are present but not analyzed.
- The analysis is based solely on static code review of the provided text; the exploit code was not executed.
- The evidence packet reports complete_artifact_coverage is false, indicating not all artifact files were included.
- The review is based solely on the supplied text files; binary files and the Docker environment were not inspected.
- The analysis assumes the operator runs the PoC against their own lab environment as intended; misuse against unauthorized targets is outside the scope of backdoor review.
Model interpretationThis review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.