Technical assessment
Three Python scripts that exploit CVE-2026-0765, an OS command injection in Open WebUI's install_frontmatter_requirements function, to achieve remote code execution as root via pip install with attacker-controlled URLs, VCS specifiers, and pip flag injection.
Backdoor review
No backdoor observed in reviewed code
The PoC for CVE-2026-0765 is a disclosed exploit against Open WebUI. All three vectors (HTTP sdist, git+http VCS, pip flag injection) target the stated vulnerability in install_frontmatter_requirements() to achieve RCE on the target server. The payloads write marker files to /tmp on the target to confirm exploitation. No concealed behavior, unrelated payloads, or data exfiltration to an undisclosed third party was observed. The binary file (evil-1.0.tar.gz) was not inspected, but its source code is present in the text files and matches the disclosed exploit behavior.
Model confidence98%
AuthenticationRequired
Languagespython
Target softwareOpen WebUI
Attack typescommand_injectionremote_code_execution
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidenceClassification basis and observed behavior
Classification basis
The primary artifact consists of three Python scripts (poc.py, poc_vector2_git.py, poc_vector3_flaginjection.py) that actively exploit CVE-2026-0765 by building and serving malicious payloads, authenticating to the target, triggering the vulnerable pip install, and verifying remote code execution. The scripts are designed to exercise the vulnerability, not merely detect it.
poc/poc.py:1-17poc/poc.py:189-197poc/poc_vector2_git.py:1-17poc/poc_vector3_flaginjection.py:1-17Requirements
- Target Open WebUI instance reachable from host
poc/poc.py:35 - Host reachable from target container for pip to fetch payload
poc/poc.py:36 - Authenticated user with tool/function creation permissions
README.md:32
Observed behavior
- Builds a malicious Python sdist tar.gz with a weaponized setup.py that writes marker files to /tmp
poc/poc.py:110-152 - Starts an HTTP server to host the malicious package
poc/poc.py:176-182 - Authenticates to Open WebUI via signup or signin
poc/poc.py:236-281 - Creates a tool with crafted frontmatter containing a malicious pip requirements URL
poc/poc.py:286-320 - Verifies RCE by reading marker files written by the malicious setup.py via docker exec
poc/poc.py:341-394 - Vector 2 creates a malicious git repository and serves it via a minimal git smart HTTP server
poc/poc_vector2_git.py:119-178 - Vector 3 hosts a fake PEP 503 PyPI index and injects --extra-index-url and --trusted-host pip flags via comma-separated requirements
poc/poc_vector3_flaginjection.py:161-236
Safety-review evidenceBehaviors behind the backdoor verdict
Observables
- Marker File
- /tmp/pwned_cve_2026_0765Written by the malicious setup.py on the target to confirm RCE.
poc/poc.py:65 - Marker File
- /tmp/pwned_cve_2026_0765_gitWritten by the git+http vector payload on the target to confirm RCE.
poc/poc_vector2_git.py:65 - Marker File
- /tmp/pwned_cve_2026_0765_flaginjectWritten by the flag injection vector payload on the target to confirm RCE.
poc/poc_vector3_flaginjection.py:66 - Target Url
- http://{target_host}:{target_port}The target Open WebUI instance, configured by the operator via command-line arguments.
poc/poc.py:422-425 - Attacker Url
- http://{attacker_host}:{attacker_port}The attacker-controlled server hosting the malicious payload, configured by the operator.
poc/poc.py:422-425
Review boundariesWhat the analysis did not establish
- One binary file (poc/malicious_pkg/evil-1.0.tar.gz, 930 bytes) was flagged as binary and not analyzed; it is a pre-built malicious sdist package whose contents are partially reconstructed from the text scripts.
- The evidence includes a verification report (poc_verification_report.md) claiming successful exploitation, but the analysis treats all supplied data as untrusted and does not confirm execution.
- One binary file (poc/malicious_pkg/evil-1.0.tar.gz, 930 bytes) was not inspected. Its source code is present in the text files and matches the disclosed exploit behavior.
Model interpretationThis review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.