BlackSnufkin/CredsHunter
PoC files
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Analysis
Technical assessment
A Rust-based LSASS credential dump exploit that leverages a PPL-bypassing handle leak (CVE-2026-3609) in the xhunter1.sys kernel driver. It opens the driver, sends command 785 to obtain a kernel-minted PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS handle to lsass.exe, and then uses that handle to read and decrypt NTLM/SHA1 hashes and WDigest plaintext credentials.
Backdoor review
No backdoor observed in reviewed code
The reviewed text files (Cargo.toml, README.md, src/main.rs) describe and implement a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-3609, which leverages a vulnerable kernel driver to dump LSASS credentials. The code performs only the documented credential-dumping behavior. No concealed executable behavior, unrelated payloads, persistence mechanisms, or operator-directed harm were observed in the supplied text evidence.
Classification basis and observed behavior
Classification basis
The artifact is a fully functional exploit. It actively exercises the CVE-2026-3609 vulnerability by sending a specific command to the vulnerable driver to obtain a privileged handle, and then uses that handle to perform a credential dump from the LSASS process. The README explicitly describes it as a 'proof-of-concept' and details the exploitation chain, while the source code in main.rs implements the full attack flow.
README.md:5README.md:7src/main.rs:1-8src/main.rs:38-108Requirements
- The vulnerable xhunter1.sys driver must be loaded as a kernel service on the target system.
README.md:36-41 - The attacker must have the ability to execute the compiled CredsHunter.exe binary on the target.
README.md:24-30
Observed behavior
- Opens a handle to the xhunter1.sys driver device via CreateFile.
README.md:88 - Sends a WriteFile command (785) to the driver to obtain a kernel-minted PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS handle to the lsass.exe process, bypassing PPL.
README.md:89 - Uses the obtained handle to read memory from lsass.exe, either via ReadProcessMemory or a driver-side memcpy fallback (command 787).
README.md:90 - Locates and extracts the 3DES encryption key and IV from the remote lsass.exe process.
README.md:91 - Walks the LogonSessionList in lsass.exe memory, decrypts credential blobs, and prints NTLM and SHA1 hashes for active logon sessions.
README.md:92 - Attempts to dump WDigest plaintext credentials from memory.
src/main.rs:94-105
Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict
Observables
- Vulnerable Driver Inclusion
- xhunter1.sys (SHA-256: e727d0753d2cd0b2f6eeba4cea53aa10b3ff3ed2afeb78f545fcf6d840f85c3e)The repository includes the vulnerable signed driver binary to enable end-to-end reproduction of the exploit, as stated in README.md lines 16-17.
README.md:16-17 - Credential Dumping Behavior
- LSASS credential dump via PPL-bypassing handle leakThe main.rs code opens the vulnerable driver, obtains a handle to lsass.exe, extracts the 3DES key, and dumps NTLM/SHA1 hashes and WDigest plaintexts. This matches the documented exploit behavior.
src/main.rs:38-108
What the analysis did not establish
- The analysis is based on the provided text files (Cargo.toml, README.md, src/main.rs). The remaining 11 files in the repository, including the core driver interaction logic (driver.rs, lsa.rs, logon.rs, etc.) and the vulnerable binary (xhunter1.sys), were not provided as text and were not analyzed.
- The evidence packet indicates 'complete_artifact_coverage: false' and 'binary_files_uninspected: 1', confirming that not all repository content was inspected.
- The binary file xhunter1.sys was not analyzed; only its metadata is reported.
- 10 additional text files in the repository were not included in the evidence packet and were not reviewed.
- The review is limited to static analysis of the supplied text content; no dynamic analysis was performed.
This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.