HackingLZ/CVE-2025-27237
PoC files
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Analysis
Technical assessment
The artifact provides a complete proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2025-27237, a local privilege escalation in Zabbix Agent for Windows via OpenSSL config hijacking. It includes step-by-step instructions to create a malicious openssl.cnf and a DLL payload (poc.c) that writes a proof file and shows a MessageBox, achieving arbitrary code execution as SYSTEM.
Backdoor review
No backdoor observed in reviewed code
The supplied text files describe a legitimate proof-of-concept for CVE-2025-27237, a local privilege escalation in Zabbix Agent for Windows. The PoC demonstrates loading a user-supplied DLL via a malicious OpenSSL configuration file. The DLL source code (poc.c) performs only benign proof-of-execution actions: writing a timestamped file to C:\EXPLOITED.txt and optionally displaying a MessageBox. No concealed, deceptive, or operator-directed harmful behavior (such as credential theft, persistence, or unrelated remote access) is present in the reviewed evidence.
Classification basis and observed behavior
Classification basis
The primary artifact is a PoC that provides complete exploit code (poc.c) and step-by-step instructions to achieve arbitrary code execution as SYSTEM. The DLL payload performs observable malicious actions (file write, MessageBox), which is characteristic of an exploit, not merely a scanner or writeup.
CVE-2025-27237-PoC.md:1-5CVE-2025-27237-PoC.md:58-93CVE-2025-27237-PoC.md:108-114Requirements
- Local user access to Windows system with Zabbix Agent installed
CVE-2025-27237-PoC.md:24 - Zabbix Agent configured with TLS (TLSConnect=cert or TLSAccept=cert)
CVE-2025-27237-PoC.md:25 - Ability to create directories at C:\ root (default Windows permissions allow this)
CVE-2025-27237-PoC.md:26
Observed behavior
- Creates directory structure C:\vcpkg\downloads\tools\msys2\2db36fb050d01f45\etc\ssl
CVE-2025-27237-PoC.md:32-34 - Creates malicious openssl.cnf that loads a DLL via OpenSSL provider directive
CVE-2025-27237-PoC.md:40-52 - Compiles a malicious DLL (poc.c) that writes C:\EXPLOITED.txt and shows a MessageBox on DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH
CVE-2025-27237-PoC.md:58-93 - Deploys poc.dll to the vulnerable path and triggers execution by restarting Zabbix Agent service
CVE-2025-27237-PoC.md:101-114 - Verifies exploitation by checking for C:\EXPLOITED.txt proof file
CVE-2025-27237-PoC.md:116-128
Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict
Observables
- File Write
- C:\EXPLOITED.txtThe PoC DLL writes a proof-of-exploitation file to C:\EXPLOITED.txt, which is a benign indicator of successful code execution.
CVE-2025-27237-PoC.md:64-77 - Message Box
- MessageBoxA with text 'CVE-2025-27237\nCode Execution via OpenSSL Config!'The PoC DLL optionally displays a MessageBox, which is a benign, visible proof of execution.
CVE-2025-27237-PoC.md:80-84 - Dll Export
- OSSL_provider_initThe DLL exports OSSL_provider_init, which is required for OpenSSL provider loading and is consistent with the documented exploitation technique.
CVE-2025-27237-PoC.md:90-92
What the analysis did not establish
- The evidence packet does not include the actual compiled DLL or the extract_openssl_paths.py script; only source code and documentation are provided.
- The analysis_scope reports 5 unclassified files (likely the .c and .py files) that are not included in the selected text, so the full source of poc2.c, poc3.c, and extract_openssl_paths.py is not available for review.
- Five files in the repository were not included as text in the evidence packet and were not reviewed. The inventory lists poc.c, poc2.c, poc3.c, and extract_openssl_paths.py as present but their content was not supplied. The analysis scope notes binary files were flagged as metadata-only and not analyzed.
This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.