Galaxy-sc/CVE-2025-12139-WordPress-Integrate-Google-Drive-Exploit
PoC files
3 filesFile viewing is interactive and short-lived. Downloads are password-protected ZIP archives using password eip.
Analysis
Technical assessment
A Go program that fetches a target URL, searches the page source for a 'var igd' JavaScript variable, and parses it to check for exposed Google OAuth credentials and account data. It reports whether sensitive data was found but does not perform any exploitation actions.
Backdoor review
No backdoor observed in reviewed code
The supplied Go source code and README implement a straightforward proof-of-concept for CVE-2025-12139. The program fetches a target URL, extracts a JavaScript variable with a regex, parses JSON, and prints any discovered Google OAuth credentials. No hidden network calls, persistence mechanisms, credential exfiltration to a third party, or unrelated payloads are present. The behavior is fully consistent with the stated information-disclosure exploit.
Classification basis and observed behavior
Classification basis
The code only detects and reports the presence of exposed sensitive data; it does not perform any action to exploit the vulnerability such as using the credentials to access Google Drive or modify data. The README describes it as a 'Proof of Concept (PoC) exploit' but the code itself is a scanner.
CVE-2025-12139.go:1-134README.md:4Requirements
- Target URL must be provided via -u flag
CVE-2025-12139.go:53-54 - Target must have the Integrate Google Drive plugin active and exposing the 'igd' variable in page source
CVE-2025-12139.go:78-84
Observed behavior
- Fetches the target URL via HTTP GET
CVE-2025-12139.go:66-67 - Extracts the 'igd' JavaScript variable from the response body using a regex
CVE-2025-12139.go:78-79 - Parses the extracted JSON and checks for clientID, clientSecret, and Base64-encoded accounts data
CVE-2025-12139.go:89-127 - Prints whether the target is vulnerable based on the presence of sensitive data
CVE-2025-12139.go:129-133
Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict
Observables
- Network Connection
- HTTP GET to user-supplied -u target URLThe only outbound connection is the intended exploit request to the victim WordPress site; no hardcoded attacker-controlled server is contacted.
CVE-2025-12139.go:67 - Credential Extraction
- Parses 'igd' JSON for clientID, clientSecret, and Base64-encoded accountsMatches the described CVE-2025-12139 information disclosure; extracted data is only printed to stdout, not exfiltrated elsewhere.
CVE-2025-12139.go:99-121 - Author Contact
- Telegram: t.me/Dread_NetDisplayed in the banner; no code uses this for communication or data exfiltration.
CVE-2025-12139.go:47
What the analysis did not establish
- One non-text file (proof.PNG) is present but not included in the text evidence; its content cannot be analyzed.
- The evidence packet reports complete_artifact_coverage: false, indicating not all files are represented, though all selected text files are complete.
- One non-text media file (proof.PNG, 13837 bytes) was flagged as metadata-only and not analyzed; its content could theoretically contain hidden instructions, but the text-based PoC code itself shows no backdoor behavior.
- The review covers only the supplied evidence packets; no runtime behavior or external dependencies were examined.
This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.