Description

### Summary Using a CDN that caches (`/**/*.png`, `/**/*.json`, `/**/*.css`, etc...) requests, a cache deception can emerge. This could lead to unauthorized access to user sessions and personal data when cached responses are served to other users. ### Details The vulnerability occurs in the request processing logic where path sanitization is insufficient. The library splits the path using `config.basePath` but doesn't properly validate the remaining path components. This allows specially crafted requests that appear to be static assets (like `/api/auth/get-session/api/auth/image.png` assuming `config.basePath`=`/api/auth`) to bypass typical CDN cache exclusion rules while actually returning sensitive data. The problematic code [here](https://github.com/Bekacru/better-call/blob/8b6f13e24fad7f4666a582601517bb3232d4f4af/src/router.ts#L124): ```js const processRequest = async (request: Request) => { const url = new URL(request.url); const path = config?.basePath ? url.pathname.split(config.basePath)[1] : url.pathname; ``` Since this library is largely coupled with `better-auth`, it becomes more clear why this can be dangerous with an example request: <img width="800" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2ab7c4dd-0700-4f59-863f-79f2b5edbb37" /> ### Impact This is a cache deception vulnerability affecting `better-call` users with CDN caching enabled. which can expose sensitive data.

Description source: GitHub Advisory

Affected products and versions

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ProductSourceVersion rangeStatus
GitHub AdvisoryBefore 1.0.12 · Fixed in 1.0.12affected

References

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