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GitHub

Ash1996x/CVE-2025-54914-PoC

Repository PoCStars: 4Created 2025-09-12
ExploitCVE-2025-549145 files

56.2 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

The artifact is a Python-based exploit for CVE-2025-54914, an Azure Networking Elevation of Privilege vulnerability. It creates malicious routes in Azure virtual networks via the Azure Management API, includes multi-target scanning, persistence mechanisms, and evasion techniques.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The supplied evidence consists of a README and two Python scripts (exploit.py, exploit_utils.py) that implement a PoC for CVE-2025-54914, an Azure Networking Elevation of Privilege vulnerability. The code performs Azure route creation, deletion, scanning, and reporting using the Azure Management API. It includes evasion techniques (random delays, user-agent rotation), persistence via Windows scheduled tasks, and multi-target scanning. All observed behavior is consistent with the stated exploit functionality and does not exhibit concealed operator-directed harm such as credential exfiltration, unrelated remote access, or delivery of an unrelated payload. No backdoor behavior was observed.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence95%
AuthenticationRequired
LanguagesPython
Target softwareMicrosoft Azure Networking
Attack typesElevation of PrivilegeRoute Manipulation
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The code actively sends HTTP requests to the Azure Management API to create and delete routes, which constitutes exploitation of the vulnerability. The README and code comments explicitly label it as an 'exploit' and describe its purpose as creating malicious routes.

README.md:1-5exploit.py:1-5exploit.py:347-412

Requirements

  • Valid Azure access token (via Azure CLI or environment variable) with permissions to manage network routes.exploit.py:313-345
  • Target Azure subscription ID, resource group, VNet, and subnet names.exploit.py:660-672

Observed behavior

  • Creates a route in a specified Azure subnet by sending a POST request to the Azure Management API with a crafted payload containing an address prefix and next hop IP.exploit.py:347-412
  • Deletes a previously created route by sending a DELETE request to the Azure Management API.exploit.py:414-466
  • Scans multiple targets concurrently to check if they are accessible and potentially vulnerable.exploit.py:204-280
  • Implements evasion techniques such as payload withheld to avoid detection.exploit.py:103-135
  • Supports persistence mode by creating a Windows scheduled task to re-run the exploit at intervals.exploit.py:183-202
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Persistence Mechanism
Payload withheldThe PersistenceManager.create_scheduled_task method creates a scheduled task to re-run the exploit script in persistence mode. This is documented as a feature and is directly related to maintaining the exploit's route manipulation, not an unrelated backdoor.exploit.py:183-202
Evasion Technique
Payload withheldThe EvasionManager class implements random request delays and rotating user-agent strings to avoid detection during exploit operations. This is consistent with the stated purpose of the tool.exploit.py:103-135
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • Two files (out of five total) were omitted from the text evidence due to size or selection rules, but the three included files (README.md, exploit.py, exploit_utils.py) provide complete coverage of the core exploit logic and documentation.
  • The evidence does not include any binary or non-text files.
  • Two files in the repository (total 5 files) were not included as text in the evidence packet and were not reviewed. Their content is unknown.
  • The review is limited to static analysis of the provided source code; no dynamic execution or behavioral analysis was performed.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.

GitHub

Ash1996x/CVE-2025-50154-Aggressor-Script

Repository PoCStars: 1Created 2025-08-16
ExploitCVE-2025-501546 files

41.7 KiB

Analysisdeepseek-v4-pro:cloud ·

Technical assessment

A Cobalt Strike Aggressor script and standalone PowerShell script that weaponize LNK and Library-MS files to trigger SMB NTLMv2-SSP hash disclosure from Windows targets. The scripts create malicious shortcut files pointing to attacker-controlled SMB shares, causing Windows Explorer to authenticate and leak NTLM hashes when a user interacts with the file.

Backdoor review

No backdoor observed in reviewed code

The reviewed evidence consists of a README and a standalone PowerShell script that create LNK and Library-MS files to trigger SMB NTLMv2 hash disclosure. The code performs the advertised offensive security technique and contains no concealed backdoor, unrelated payload, or operator-directed harm beyond the described hash capture. No obfuscation, persistence, credential exfiltration to a third party, or hidden command execution was observed.

ClassificationExploit
Model confidence95%
AuthenticationNot required
LanguagesPowerShellAggressor Script (CNA)
Target softwareWindows File ExplorerCobalt Strike
Attack typesNTLM hash captureSMB relaycredential access
Evidence & reasoningClassification basis · observed behavior · safety review
Technical evidence

Classification basis and observed behavior

Classification basis

The artifact contains functional code (standalone_lnk_weaponizer.ps1) that creates malicious LNK files designed to trigger NTLM authentication to an attacker-controlled server, which is an active exploitation technique for credential theft. The README describes the Aggressor script as weaponizing LNK and Library-MS files for hash disclosure, and the PowerShell script includes the complete implementation to generate the weaponized file. This is exploit code, not merely a scanner or writeup.

standalone_lnk_weaponizer.ps1:94-158README.md:1-3README.md:108-112

Requirements

  • An active Cobalt Strike beacon on the target system (for the Aggressor script) or local PowerShell execution (for the standalone script).README.md:18-19standalone_lnk_weaponizer.ps1:1-4
  • An attacker-controlled SMB server (e.g., Responder, Impacket) running to capture the NTLM hashes.README.md:10-12
  • User interaction: the target user must open or interact with the generated LNK or Library-MS file.README.md:111-112README.md:117-118

Observed behavior

  • Generates a malicious LNK shortcut file that points to a remote SMB path (\\<attacker_ip>\<share>\<file>).standalone_lnk_weaponizer.ps1:112-125
  • Creates a Library-MS XML file with a UNC path reference to trigger SMB authentication (payload withheld bypass technique).README.md:114-118
  • Forces Windows Explorer to fetch the PE icon from the remote SMB location, triggering NTLM authentication and hash disclosure.README.md:108-112
  • Provides Cobalt Strike right-click menu integration and command-line commands (lnk_create, library_create, lnk_quick, library_quick) for remote deployment via beacon.README.md:47-84
Safety-review evidence

Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict

Observables

Offensive Tool
Payload withheldThe artifact is a tool for creating malicious LNK and Library-MS files to capture NTLMv2 hashes via SMB authentication, consistent with its stated purpose.README.md:1-3standalone_lnk_weaponizer.ps1:1-4
Cve Reference
Payload withheldThe README references payload withheld as a bypass technique for Library-MS files, but the supplied CVE context is for CVE-2025-50154 (Windows File Explorer spoofing). This mismatch is noted but does not indicate backdoor behavior.README.md:3
Review boundaries

What the analysis did not establish

  • The main Aggressor script (lnk_weaponizer.cna) is not included in the selected text; only the README and standalone PowerShell script are provided.
  • The evidence does not include the Library-MS creation code; only the LNK creation code is present in the standalone script.
  • The artifact is not executed, so the actual behavior and reliability of the exploit cannot be confirmed.
  • Four files in the repository were not included in the text evidence and were not analyzed; their content is unknown.
  • The main Aggressor script (lnk_weaponizer.cna) was not provided, so its behavior cannot be confirmed.
  • Binary content, if any, was flagged as metadata-only and not inspected.
Model interpretation

This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.