CVE-2025-50154
Microsoft Windows File Explorer Spoofing Vulnerability
Record summary
CVE-2025-50154 has a selected CVSS score of 6.5 (medium); EIP currently links 1 catalogued exploit and 3 repository PoCs.
Description
Exposure of sensitive information to an unauthorized actor in Windows File Explorer allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.
Exploitation context
Affected products and versions
Showing 12 of 25| Product | Source | Version range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
Windows 10 Version 1507Browse Microsoft / Windows 10 Version 1507 | CVE List | 10.0.10240.0 to < 10.0.10240.21100 | affected |
Windows 10 Version 1607Browse Microsoft / Windows 10 Version 1607 | CVE List | 10.0.14393.0 to < 10.0.14393.8330 | affected |
Windows 10 Version 1809Browse Microsoft / Windows 10 Version 1809 | CVE List | 10.0.17763.0 to < 10.0.17763.7678 | affected |
Windows 10 Version 21H2Browse Microsoft / Windows 10 Version 21H2 | CVE List | 10.0.19044.0 to < 10.0.19044.6216 | affected |
Windows 10 Version 22H2Browse Microsoft / Windows 10 Version 22H2 | CVE List | 10.0.19045.0 to < 10.0.19045.6216 | affected |
Windows 11 Version 23H2Browse Microsoft / Windows 11 Version 23H2 | CVE List | 10.0.22631.0 to < 10.0.22631.5768 | affected |
Windows 11 Version 24H2Browse Microsoft / Windows 11 Version 24H2 | CVE List | 10.0.26100.0 to < 10.0.26100.4946 | affected |
Windows 11 version 22H2Browse Microsoft / Windows 11 version 22H2 | CVE List | 10.0.22621.0 to < 10.0.22621.5768 | affected |
Windows 11 version 22H3Browse Microsoft / Windows 11 version 22H3 | CVE List | 10.0.22631.0 to < 10.0.22631.5768 | affected |
Windows Server 2008 R2 Service Pack 1Browse Microsoft / Windows Server 2008 R2 Service Pack 1 | CVE List | 6.1.7601.0 to < 6.1.7601.27872 | affected |
Windows Server 2008 R2 Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation)Browse Microsoft / Windows Server 2008 R2 Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation) | CVE List | 6.1.7601.0 to < 6.1.7601.27872 | affected |
Windows Server 2008 Service Pack 2Browse Microsoft / Windows Server 2008 Service Pack 2 | CVE List | 6.0.6003.0 to < 6.0.6003.23471 | affected |
Proofs of concept
4Catalogued exploits
ExploitDBMicrosoft Windows 10.0.19045 - NTLMv2 Hash DisclosureExploitDB exploitby Ruben EnkaouaExploit1 file
Analysis
Technical assessment
A PowerShell script that generates a malicious .LNK shortcut file. When the shortcut is viewed in Windows File Explorer, it forces the system to connect to an attacker-controlled SMB share to fetch an icon, thereby disclosing the user's NTLMv2 hash to the attacker.
Backdoor review
No backdoor observed in reviewed code
The PoC is a PowerShell script that creates a Windows shortcut (.LNK) file pointing to a remote SMB share. The script's stated purpose is to trigger NTLMv2 hash disclosure when the shortcut is viewed in Windows Explorer. The script contains no obfuscation, no concealed executable payloads, no persistence mechanisms, and no unrelated remote access. All behavior is consistent with the described exploit technique.
Classification basis and observed behavior
Classification basis
The script's stated purpose is to 'Create a malicious LNK file that triggers SMB NTLMv2-SSP hash disclosure' (line 19). It generates a file that, when interacted with, causes the victim's machine to send authentication credentials to an attacker-controlled server. This is active exploitation code, not merely a detection or reporting tool.
exploits/windows/remote/52415.txt:19Requirements
- An attacker-controlled SMB server (e.g., running Responder) must be listening on the network.
exploits/windows/remote/52415.txt:14-15 - The victim must view the folder containing the generated .LNK file in Windows File Explorer.
exploits/windows/remote/52415.txt:25-27
Observed behavior
- Creates a .LNK shortcut file with a target path pointing to a remote SMB share (\\<ip>\<share>\<file>).
exploits/windows/remote/52415.txt:53-54exploits/windows/remote/52415.txt:60 - Sets the shortcut's icon to a local, default Windows icon (SHELL32.dll) to appear benign.
exploits/windows/remote/52415.txt:55exploits/windows/remote/52415.txt:61 - When the shortcut is rendered by File Explorer, the system attempts to authenticate to the remote SMB server to fetch the icon, leaking the NTLMv2 hash.
exploits/windows/remote/52415.txt:25-27
Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict
Observables
- Network Target
- Payload withheldThe script constructs a UNC path from user-supplied parameters and sets it as the shortcut target, which will cause Windows Explorer to attempt SMB authentication to the specified remote server.
exploits/windows/remote/52415.txt:54 - File Creation
- Payload withheldThe script creates a .LNK file in the user-specified path, which is the delivery mechanism for the NTLMv2 hash disclosure attack.
exploits/windows/remote/52415.txt:53
What the analysis did not establish
- The analysis is based solely on the provided text file; the script was not executed, and its effectiveness is not verified.
- The artifact relies on an external SMB server (e.g., Responder) which is not included in the evidence.
- The evidence does not include any demonstration of the hash being captured or cracked.
- Only the supplied text file was reviewed; no external resources, binaries, or network content were inspected.
- The script's behavior when executed is not verified; the review is based solely on static analysis of the provided source code.
This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.
Repository PoCs
GitHubzenzue/CVE-2025-50154Repository PoCby zenzueStars: 3Scanner3 files
Analysis
Technical assessment
The artifact is a defensive toolkit and detection rule set for auditing, hardening, and hunting NTLM/SMB usage related to CVE-2025-50154. It includes a PowerShell script for configuration checks and hardening, and Sigma rules for detecting suspicious Explorer-initiated SMB connections. It does not contain exploit code.
Backdoor review
No backdoor observed in reviewed code
The repository contains a README and a Sigma detection rule file. The README describes a defensive NTLM/SMB hardening and threat hunting toolkit, and the Sigma file provides detection rules for suspicious NTLM/SMB activity. No executable code, obfuscated payloads, or instructions to run untrusted binaries are present. The content is purely informational and defensive in nature.
Classification basis and observed behavior
Classification basis
The artifact's primary purpose is to detect and audit for the vulnerability, not to exploit it. The README describes a toolkit for auditing, hardening, and hunting, and the Sigma rules are detection signatures. No code is present that exercises the vulnerability to gain unauthorized access or leak credentials.
README.md:5README.md:27-41sigma_cve-2025-50154_ntlm_smb_hunting_f86eb3dc.yml:1-4Requirements
- The PowerShell script requires execution on a Windows host with appropriate permissions to read and modify registry, service, and firewall configurations.
README.md:28-30 - The Sigma rules require a SIEM or log analysis platform with ingested Windows Event Logs (Security, Sysmon) or Windows Filtering Platform events.
sigma_cve-2025-50154_ntlm_smb_hunting_f86eb3dc.yml:13-16
Observed behavior
- The PowerShell script audits current registry, service, and firewall configurations and outputs pass/fail results with recommended fixes.
README.md:27-28 - The PowerShell script applies security hardening settings such as NTLM restrictions, SMB signing, and disabling SMBv1.
README.md:29-30 - The PowerShell script performs event hunting by gathering NTLM operational logs, security logon events, and Sysmon network connection events.
README.md:33-38 - The Sigma rules detect Explorer.exe initiating SMB connections to untrusted networks, LNK file creation on desktops, and NTLM network logons to untrusted addresses.
sigma_cve-2025-50154_ntlm_smb_hunting_f86eb3dc.yml:1-4sigma_cve-2025-50154_ntlm_smb_hunting_f86eb3dc.yml:60-63sigma_cve-2025-50154_ntlm_smb_hunting_f86eb3dc.yml:90-93
Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict
Observables
- File
- Payload withheldDescribes a defensive toolkit for auditing and hardening NTLM/SMB configurations, with no executable payload.
README.md:1-135 - File
- Payload withheldContains Sigma detection rules for identifying suspicious NTLM/SMB activity, with no executable payload.
sigma_cve-2025-50154_ntlm_smb_hunting_f86eb3dc.yml:1-251
What the analysis did not establish
- The PowerShell script content is not included in the evidence; only its description in the README is available.
- The evidence includes only two of three total files; one file is omitted.
- The artifact's complete_artifact_coverage is false, indicating not all files were analyzed.
- One file (unclassified, 16285 bytes) was not provided as text and was not analyzed; its content is unknown.
- The analysis is limited to the supplied text evidence and does not include execution or dynamic analysis.
This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.
GitHubrubenformation/CVE-2025-50154Repository PoCby rubenformationStars: 55Exploit3 files
Analysis
Technical assessment
A PowerShell script (poc.ps1) that crafts a malicious .LNK shortcut file. When the shortcut is placed on a victim's Windows system, File Explorer automatically attempts to fetch a remote PE file over SMB to extract its icon, triggering an NTLMv2-SSP hash disclosure to an attacker-controlled server without user interaction.
Backdoor review
No backdoor observed in reviewed code
The repository contains a proof-of-concept (PoC) for CVE-2025-50154 and CVE-2025-59214, which are NTLM hash disclosure vulnerabilities in Windows File Explorer. The PoC consists of a README.md documentation file and a poc.ps1 PowerShell script. The script creates a .LNK shortcut file that points to a remote SMB server, causing Explorer to attempt to fetch an icon and leak NTLM credentials. The script performs only the described PoC behavior: it constructs a shortcut with user-supplied parameters and saves it to disk. No backdoor, trojan, or deceptive payload targeting the person running the PoC was observed. The code is transparent, well-documented, and contains no obfuscation, persistence mechanisms, credential exfiltration to unrelated parties, or concealed harmful behavior.
Classification basis and observed behavior
Classification basis
The artifact includes a functional PowerShell script (poc.ps1) that generates a malicious .LNK file designed to trigger an NTLMv2 hash disclosure vulnerability in Windows File Explorer. The README explicitly describes this as a 'Zero Click NTLMv2-SSP Hash Disclosure' and provides step-by-step instructions for setting up an attacker SMB server and deploying the crafted shortcut to a victim. This constitutes code intended to exercise a vulnerability, which meets the definition of an exploit.
README.md:3README.md:14poc.ps1:1-46Requirements
- An attacker-controlled SMB server (e.g., impacket-smbserver) hosting a PE binary file.
README.md:35-36 - Ability to deliver the crafted .LNK file to the victim's filesystem (e.g., via malicious download or SMB upload).
README.md:39
Observed behavior
- Creates a .LNK shortcut file with a target path pointing to a remote SMB-hosted binary and an icon location set to a local shell32.dll.
poc.ps1:34-43 - When the .LNK file is rendered by explorer.exe, the process fetches the remote PE file to extract its icon resources, causing the victim to authenticate to the attacker's SMB server and disclose NTLMv2-SSP hashes.
README.md:25README.md:46
Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict
Observables
- Network Target
- Payload withheldThe LNK file's TargetPath is set to a user-supplied remote SMB path, which is the core of the NTLM hash disclosure technique.
poc.ps1:35poc.ps1:41 - File Creation
- Payload withheldThe script creates a .LNK file on the local filesystem at the user-specified path.
poc.ps1:34poc.ps1:40-43
What the analysis did not establish
- One file (total 3) is omitted from the packet; its content is not provided, but the README and PoC script are complete.
- The evidence does not include the actual PE binary file to be hosted on the SMB server.
- The analysis is based solely on the supplied text; the code was not executed, and its effectiveness is not verified.
- One file (Taskmgr.exe, 1497 bytes) was classified as binary and was not inspected for content; it is a standard Windows executable used as an example icon source and is not executed by the PoC.
This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.
GitHubAsh1996x/CVE-2025-50154-Aggressor-ScriptRepository PoCby Ash1996xStars: 1Exploit6 files
Analysis
Technical assessment
A Cobalt Strike Aggressor script and standalone PowerShell script that weaponize LNK and Library-MS files to trigger SMB NTLMv2-SSP hash disclosure from Windows targets. The scripts create malicious shortcut files pointing to attacker-controlled SMB shares, causing Windows Explorer to authenticate and leak NTLM hashes when a user interacts with the file.
Backdoor review
No backdoor observed in reviewed code
The reviewed evidence consists of a README and a standalone PowerShell script that create LNK and Library-MS files to trigger SMB NTLMv2 hash disclosure. The code performs the advertised offensive security technique and contains no concealed backdoor, unrelated payload, or operator-directed harm beyond the described hash capture. No obfuscation, persistence, credential exfiltration to a third party, or hidden command execution was observed.
Classification basis and observed behavior
Classification basis
The artifact contains functional code (standalone_lnk_weaponizer.ps1) that creates malicious LNK files designed to trigger NTLM authentication to an attacker-controlled server, which is an active exploitation technique for credential theft. The README describes the Aggressor script as weaponizing LNK and Library-MS files for hash disclosure, and the PowerShell script includes the complete implementation to generate the weaponized file. This is exploit code, not merely a scanner or writeup.
standalone_lnk_weaponizer.ps1:94-158README.md:1-3README.md:108-112Requirements
- An active Cobalt Strike beacon on the target system (for the Aggressor script) or local PowerShell execution (for the standalone script).
README.md:18-19standalone_lnk_weaponizer.ps1:1-4 - An attacker-controlled SMB server (e.g., Responder, Impacket) running to capture the NTLM hashes.
README.md:10-12 - User interaction: the target user must open or interact with the generated LNK or Library-MS file.
README.md:111-112README.md:117-118
Observed behavior
- Generates a malicious LNK shortcut file that points to a remote SMB path (\\<attacker_ip>\<share>\<file>).
standalone_lnk_weaponizer.ps1:112-125 - Creates a Library-MS XML file with a UNC path reference to trigger SMB authentication (payload withheld bypass technique).
README.md:114-118 - Forces Windows Explorer to fetch the PE icon from the remote SMB location, triggering NTLM authentication and hash disclosure.
README.md:108-112 - Provides Cobalt Strike right-click menu integration and command-line commands (lnk_create, library_create, lnk_quick, library_quick) for remote deployment via beacon.
README.md:47-84
Behaviors behind the backdoor verdict
Observables
- Offensive Tool
- Payload withheldThe artifact is a tool for creating malicious LNK and Library-MS files to capture NTLMv2 hashes via SMB authentication, consistent with its stated purpose.
README.md:1-3standalone_lnk_weaponizer.ps1:1-4 - Cve Reference
- Payload withheldThe README references payload withheld as a bypass technique for Library-MS files, but the supplied CVE context is for CVE-2025-50154 (Windows File Explorer spoofing). This mismatch is noted but does not indicate backdoor behavior.
README.md:3
What the analysis did not establish
- The main Aggressor script (lnk_weaponizer.cna) is not included in the selected text; only the README and standalone PowerShell script are provided.
- The evidence does not include the Library-MS creation code; only the LNK creation code is present in the standalone script.
- The artifact is not executed, so the actual behavior and reliability of the exploit cannot be confirmed.
- Four files in the repository were not included in the text evidence and were not analyzed; their content is unknown.
- The main Aggressor script (lnk_weaponizer.cna) was not provided, so its behavior cannot be confirmed.
- Binary content, if any, was flagged as metadata-only and not inspected.
This review is limited to the supplied PoC code and context. It does not assert that the code works or is safe to execute.