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CVE-2019-17211 9.8 CRITICAL 1 Writeup EPSS 0.01

An integer overflow was discovered in the CoAP library in Arm Mbed OS 5.14.0. The function sn_coap_builder_calc_needed_packet_data_size_2() is used to calculate the required memory for the CoAP message from the sn_coap_hdr_s data structure. Both returned_byte_count and src_coap_msg_ptr->payload_len are of type uint16_t. When added together, the result returned_byte_count can wrap around the maximum uint16_t value. As a result, insufficient buffer space is allocated for the corresponding CoAP message.

CWE-190 Nov 05, 2019

CVE-2014-8093 EPSS 0.01

Multiple integer overflows in the GLX extension in XFree86 4.0, X.Org X Window System (aka X11 or X) X11R6.7, and X.Org Server (aka xserver and xorg-server) before 1.16.3 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted request to the (1) __glXDisp_ReadPixels, (2) __glXDispSwap_ReadPixels, (3) __glXDisp_GetTexImage, (4) __glXDispSwap_GetTexImage, (5) GetSeparableFilter, (6) GetConvolutionFilter, (7) GetHistogram, (8) GetMinmax, (9) GetColorTable, (10) __glXGetAnswerBuffer, (11) __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER, (12) __glXMap1dReqSize, (13) __glXMap1fReqSize, (14) Map2Size, (15) __glXMap2dReqSize, (16) __glXMap2fReqSize, (17) __glXImageSize, or (18) __glXSeparableFilter2DReqSize function, which triggers an out-of-bounds read or write.

Dec 10, 2014

CVE-2025-62496 8.8 HIGH EPSS 0.00

A vulnerability exists in the QuickJS engine's BigInt string parsing logic (js_bigint_from_string) when attempting to create a BigInt from a string with an excessively large number of digits. The function calculates the necessary number of bits (n_bits) required to store the BigInt using the formula: $$\text{n\_bits} = (\text{n\_digits} \times 27 + 7) / 8 \quad (\text{for radix 10})$$ * For large input strings (e.g., $79,536,432$ digits or more for base 10), the intermediate calculation $(\text{n\_digits} \times 27 + 7)$ exceeds the maximum value of a standard signed 32-bit integer, resulting in an Integer Overflow. * The resulting n_bits value becomes unexpectedly small or even negative due to this wrap-around. * This flawed n_bits is then used to compute n_limbs, the number of memory "limbs" needed for the BigInt object. Since n_bits is too small, the calculated n_limbs is also significantly underestimated. * The function proceeds to allocate a JSBigInt object using this underestimated n_limbs. * When the function later attempts to write the actual BigInt data into the allocated object, the small buffer size is quickly exceeded, leading to a Heap Out-of-Bounds Write as data is written past the end of the allocated r->tab array.

CWE-190 Oct 16, 2025

CVE-2023-54072 EPSS 0.00

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: pcm: Fix potential data race at PCM memory allocation helpers The PCM memory allocation helpers have a sanity check against too many buffer allocations. However, the check is performed without a proper lock and the allocation isn't serialized; this allows user to allocate more memories than predefined max size. Practically seen, this isn't really a big problem, as it's more or less some "soft limit" as a sanity check, and it's not possible to allocate unlimitedly. But it's still better to address this for more consistent behavior. The patch covers the size check in do_alloc_pages() with the card->memory_mutex, and increases the allocated size there for preventing the further overflow. When the actual allocation fails, the size is decreased accordingly.

Dec 24, 2025

CVE-2022-24795 5.9 MEDIUM 1 Writeup EPSS 0.01

yajl-ruby is a C binding to the YAJL JSON parsing and generation library. The 1.x branch and the 2.x branch of `yajl` contain an integer overflow which leads to subsequent heap memory corruption when dealing with large (~2GB) inputs. The reallocation logic at `yajl_buf.c#L64` may result in the `need` 32bit integer wrapping to 0 when `need` approaches a value of 0x80000000 (i.e. ~2GB of data), which results in a reallocation of buf->alloc into a small heap chunk. These integers are declared as `size_t` in the 2.x branch of `yajl`, which practically prevents the issue from triggering on 64bit platforms, however this does not preclude this issue triggering on 32bit builds on which `size_t` is a 32bit integer. Subsequent population of this under-allocated heap chunk is based on the original buffer size, leading to heap memory corruption. This vulnerability mostly impacts process availability. Maintainers believe exploitation for arbitrary code execution is unlikely. A patch is available and anticipated to be part of yajl-ruby version 1.4.2. As a workaround, avoid passing large inputs to YAJL.

CWE-190 Apr 05, 2022

CVE-2022-48744 7.8 HIGH EPSS 0.00

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Avoid field-overflowing memcpy() In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid intentionally writing across neighboring fields. Use flexible arrays instead of zero-element arrays (which look like they are always overflowing) and split the cross-field memcpy() into two halves that can be appropriately bounds-checked by the compiler. We were doing: #define ETH_HLEN 14 #define VLAN_HLEN 4 ... #define MLX5E_XDP_MIN_INLINE (ETH_HLEN + VLAN_HLEN) ... struct mlx5e_tx_wqe *wqe = mlx5_wq_cyc_get_wqe(wq, pi); ... struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg *eseg = &wqe->eth; struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg *dseg = wqe->data; ... memcpy(eseg->inline_hdr.start, xdptxd->data, MLX5E_XDP_MIN_INLINE); target is wqe->eth.inline_hdr.start (which the compiler sees as being 2 bytes in size), but copying 18, intending to write across start (really vlan_tci, 2 bytes). The remaining 16 bytes get written into wqe->data[0], covering byte_count (4 bytes), lkey (4 bytes), and addr (8 bytes). struct mlx5e_tx_wqe { struct mlx5_wqe_ctrl_seg ctrl; /* 0 16 */ struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg eth; /* 16 16 */ struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg data[]; /* 32 0 */ /* size: 32, cachelines: 1, members: 3 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ }; struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg { u8 swp_outer_l4_offset; /* 0 1 */ u8 swp_outer_l3_offset; /* 1 1 */ u8 swp_inner_l4_offset; /* 2 1 */ u8 swp_inner_l3_offset; /* 3 1 */ u8 cs_flags; /* 4 1 */ u8 swp_flags; /* 5 1 */ __be16 mss; /* 6 2 */ __be32 flow_table_metadata; /* 8 4 */ union { struct { __be16 sz; /* 12 2 */ u8 start[2]; /* 14 2 */ } inline_hdr; /* 12 4 */ struct { __be16 type; /* 12 2 */ __be16 vlan_tci; /* 14 2 */ } insert; /* 12 4 */ __be32 trailer; /* 12 4 */ }; /* 12 4 */ /* size: 16, cachelines: 1, members: 9 */ /* last cacheline: 16 bytes */ }; struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg { __be32 byte_count; /* 0 4 */ __be32 lkey; /* 4 4 */ __be64 addr; /* 8 8 */ /* size: 16, cachelines: 1, members: 3 */ /* last cacheline: 16 bytes */ }; So, split the memcpy() so the compiler can reason about the buffer sizes. "pahole" shows no size nor member offset changes to struct mlx5e_tx_wqe nor struct mlx5e_umr_wqe. "objdump -d" shows no meaningful object code changes (i.e. only source line number induced differences and optimizations).

CWE-787 Jun 20, 2024