6 articles in this topic.
We forked Shannon a third time. Seven AI agents, source code as the starting point, sanitizer-instrumented builds, and a pipeline that read 259 C files, built its own fuzzing harnesses, ran 18,000 iterations, and found a previously unknown FastCGI protocol desynchronization bug in nginx. Two hours. Twenty-five dollars.
The first post ended with 'not a shell.' This one ends with uid=0(root) - with an asterisk. Ten context windows. A UTF-8 encoding barrier that blocks every libc address. A PLT mapping that lied. A stack alignment problem solved by a NULL pointer and a filename that shouldn't exist. The story of how a pre-auth xrdp overflow became (almost) pure-network RCE - through the most absurd gadget chain we've ever built.
xrdp. Pre-authentication. A full RDP handshake implemented from scratch. UTF-8 encoding constraints that break your ROP chain. A false crash path that wasted hours. And a 3-byte partial overwrite technique that reaches any address in the binary. Stackforge's hardest target yet - and the most honest result.
The public material available during this CVE-2025-62507 run was a crash PoC. StackForge pursued RCE, then repeated the work with ASLR enabled.
We forked Shannon again - this time for binary exploit development. Nine AI agents, GDB as an MCP tool, packet capture via SharkMCP, and a pipeline that turned an OpenSSL stack buffer overflow into three independent ROP chains with GDB-verified RCE. Eighty-five minutes. Twenty-five dollars. Here's how Stackforge works.
We forked Shannon - the open-source AI pentesting framework - and wired it to the EIP MCP server. Six AI agents, one CVE number, 32 minutes: a working RCE PoC for a CVSS 10.0 vulnerability with zero existing public exploits. Here's how it happened.