CVE-2026-25761
8.8
HIGH
EPSS 0.00
Github Actions Super-linter/super-linter < 8.3.1 - Command Injection
Super-linter is a combination of multiple linters to run as a GitHub Action or standalone. From 6.0.0 to 8.3.0, the Super-linter GitHub Action is vulnerable to command injection via crafted filenames. When this action is used in downstream GitHub Actions workflows, an attacker can submit a pull request that introduces a file whose name contains shell command substitution syntax, such as $(...). In affected Super-linter versions, runtime scripts may execute the embedded command during file discovery processing, enabling arbitrary command execution in the workflow runner context. This can be used to disclose the job’s GITHUB_TOKEN depending on how the workflow configures permissions. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.3.1.
CWE-77
Feb 09, 2026
CVE-2026-25598
5.3
MEDIUM
EPSS 0.00
Harden-Runner <2.14.2 - Privilege Escalation
Harden-Runner is a CI/CD security agent that works like an EDR for GitHub Actions runners. Prior to 2.14.2, a security vulnerability has been identified in the Harden-Runner GitHub Action (Community Tier) that allows outbound network connections to evade audit logging. Specifically, outbound traffic using the sendto, sendmsg, and sendmmsg socket system calls can bypass detection and logging when using egress-policy: audit. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.14.2.
CWE-778
Feb 09, 2026
CVE-2024-48908
1 Writeup
EPSS 0.00
Github Actions Lycheeverse/lychee-action < 2.0.2 - Code Injection
lychee link checking action checks links in Markdown, HTML, and text files using lychee. Prior to version 2.0.2, there is a potential attack of arbitrary code injection vulnerability in lychee-setup of the composite action at action.yml. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.2.
CWE-94
Aug 28, 2025
CVE-2025-54416
9.1
CRITICAL
1 Writeup
EPSS 0.00
Github Actions Tj-actions/branch-names < 9.0.0 - Command Injection
tj-actions/branch-names is a Github actions repository that contains workflows to retrieve branch or tag names with support for all events. In versions 8.2.1 and below, a critical vulnerability has been identified in the tj-actions/branch-names' GitHub Action workflow which allows arbitrary command execution in downstream workflows. This issue arises due to inconsistent input sanitization and unescaped output, enabling malicious actors to exploit specially crafted branch names or tags. While internal sanitization mechanisms have been implemented, the action outputs remain vulnerable, exposing consuming workflows to significant security risks. This is fixed in version 9.0.0
CWE-77
Jul 26, 2025
CVE-2025-47271
1 Writeup
EPSS 0.00
OZI <1.13.5 - Code Injection
The OZI action is a GitHub Action that publishes releases to PyPI and mirror releases, signature bundles, and provenance in a tagged release. In versions 1.13.2 through 1.13.5, potentially untrusted data flows into PR creation logic. A malicious actor could construct a branch name that injects arbitrary code. This is patched in 1.13.6. As a workaround, one may downgrade to a version prior to 1.13.2.
CWE-95
May 12, 2025
CVE-2025-32955
6.0
MEDIUM
1 Writeup
EPSS 0.00
Harden-Runner <2.12.0 - Privilege Escalation
Harden-Runner is a CI/CD security agent that works like an EDR for GitHub Actions runners. Versions from 0.12.0 to before 2.12.0 are vulnerable to `disable-sudo` bypass. Harden-Runner includes a policy option `disable-sudo` to prevent the GitHub Actions runner user from using sudo. This is implemented by removing the runner user from the sudoers file. However, this control can be bypassed as the runner user, being part of the docker group, can interact with the Docker daemon to launch privileged containers or access the host filesystem. This allows the attacker to regain root access or restore the sudoers file, effectively bypassing the restriction. This issue has been patched in version 2.12.0.
CWE-269
Apr 21, 2025
CVE-2025-31479
8.2
HIGH
1 Writeup
EPSS 0.00
Github Actions Canonical/get-workflow... - Log Information Exposure
canonical/get-workflow-version-action is a GitHub composite action to get commit SHA that GitHub Actions reusable workflow was called with. Prior to 1.0.1, if the get-workflow-version-action step fails, the exception output may include the GITHUB_TOKEN. If the full token is included in the exception output, GitHub will automatically redact the secret from the GitHub Actions logs. However, the token may be truncated—causing part of the GITHUB_TOKEN to be displayed in plaintext in the GitHub Actions logs. Anyone with read access to the GitHub repository can view GitHub Actions logs. For public repositories, anyone can view the GitHub Actions logs. The opportunity to exploit this vulnerability is limited—the GITHUB_TOKEN is automatically revoked when the job completes. However, there is an opportunity for an attack in the time between the GITHUB_TOKEN being displayed in the logs and the completion of the job. Users using the github-token input are impacted. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.1.
CWE-532
Apr 02, 2025
CVE-2025-30154
8.6
HIGH
KEV
1 Writeup
EPSS 0.15
reviewdog/action-setup <v1 - RCE
reviewdog/action-setup is a GitHub action that installs reviewdog. reviewdog/action-setup@v1 was compromised March 11, 2025, between 18:42 and 20:31 UTC, with malicious code added that dumps exposed secrets to Github Actions Workflow Logs. Other reviewdog actions that use `reviewdog/action-setup@v1` that would also be compromised, regardless of version or pinning method, are reviewdog/action-shellcheck, reviewdog/action-composite-template, reviewdog/action-staticcheck, reviewdog/action-ast-grep, and reviewdog/action-typos.
CWE-506
Mar 19, 2025
CVE-2025-24362
1 Writeup
EPSS 0.00
Github Actions Github/codeql-action - Log Information Exposure
In some circumstances, debug artifacts uploaded by the CodeQL Action after a failed code scanning workflow run may contain the environment variables from the workflow run, including any secrets that were exposed as environment variables to the workflow. Users with read access to the repository would be able to access this artifact, containing any secrets from the environment. This vulnerability is patched in CodeQL Action version 3.28.3 or later, or CodeQL CLI version 2.20.3 or later.
For some affected workflow runs, the exposed environment variables in the debug artifacts included a valid `GITHUB_TOKEN` for the workflow run, which has access to the repository in which the workflow ran, and all the permissions specified in the workflow or job. The `GITHUB_TOKEN` is valid until the job completes or 24 hours has elapsed, whichever comes first.
Environment variables are exposed only from workflow runs that satisfy all of the following conditions:
- Code scanning workflow configured to scan the Java/Kotlin languages.
- Running in a repository containing Kotlin source code.
- Running with debug artifacts enabled.
- Using CodeQL Action versions <= 3.28.2, and CodeQL CLI versions >= 2.9.2 (May 2022) and <= 2.20.2.
- The workflow run fails before the CodeQL database is finalized within the `github/codeql-action/analyze` step.
- Running in any GitHub environment: GitHub.com, GitHub Enterprise Cloud, and GitHub Enterprise Server. Note: artifacts are only accessible to users within the same GitHub environment with access to the scanned repo.
The `GITHUB_TOKEN` exposed in this way would only have been valid for workflow runs that satisfy all of the following conditions, in addition to the conditions above:
- Using CodeQL Action versions >= 3.26.11 (October 2024) and <= 3.28.2, or >= 2.26.11 and < 3.
- Running in GitHub.com or GitHub Enterprise Cloud only (not valid on GitHub Enterprise Server).
In rare cases during advanced setup, logging of environment variables may also occur during database creation of Java, Swift, and C/C++. Please read the corresponding CodeQL CLI advisory GHSA-gqh3-9prg-j95m for more details.
In CodeQL CLI versions >= 2.9.2 and <= 2.20.2, the CodeQL Kotlin extractor logs all environment variables by default into an intermediate file during the process of creating a CodeQL database for Kotlin code. This is a part of the CodeQL CLI and is invoked by the CodeQL Action for analyzing Kotlin repositories.
On Actions, the environment variables logged include GITHUB_TOKEN, which grants permissions to the repository being scanned.
The intermediate file containing environment variables is deleted when finalizing the database, so it is not included in a successfully created database. It is, however, included in the debug artifact that is uploaded on a failed analysis run if the CodeQL Action was invoked in debug mode.
Therefore, under these specific circumstances (incomplete database creation using the CodeQL Action in debug mode) an attacker with access to the debug artifact would gain unauthorized access to repository secrets from the environment, including both the `GITHUB_TOKEN` and any user-configured secrets made available via environment variables.
The impact of the `GITHUB_TOKEN` leaked in this environment is limited:
- For workflows on GitHub.com and GitHub Enterprise Cloud using CodeQL Action versions >= 3.26.11 and <= 3.28.2, or >= 2.26.11 and < 3, which in turn use the `actions/artifacts v4` library, the debug artifact is uploaded before the workflow job completes. During this time the `GITHUB_TOKEN` is still valid, providing an opportunity for attackers to gain access to the repository.
- For all other workflows, the debug artifact is uploaded after the workflow job completes, at which point the leaked `GITHUB_TOKEN` has been revoked and cannot be used to access the repository.
CWE-532
Jan 24, 2025
CVE-2023-30853
7.6
HIGH
EPSS 0.00
Gradle Build Action < 2.4.2 - Information Disclosure
Gradle Build Action allows users to execute a Gradle Build in their GitHub Actions workflow. A vulnerability impacts GitHub workflows using the Gradle Build Action prior to version 2.4.2 that have executed the Gradle Build Tool with the configuration cache enabled, potentially exposing secrets configured for the repository.
Secrets configured for GitHub Actions are normally passed to the Gradle Build Tool via environment variables. Due to the way that the Gradle Build Tool records these environment variables, they may be persisted into an entry in the GitHub Actions cache. This data stored in the GitHub Actions cache can be read by a GitHub Actions workflow running in an untrusted context, such as that running for a Pull Request submitted by a developer via a repository fork.
This vulnerability was discovered internally through code review, and we have not seen any evidence of it being exploited in the wild. However, in addition to upgrading the Gradle Build Action, affected users should delete any potentially vulnerable cache entries and may choose to rotate any potentially affected secrets.
Gradle Build Action v2.4.2 and newer no longer saves this sensitive data for later use, preventing ongoing leakage of secrets via the GitHub Actions Cache.
While upgrading to the latest version of the Gradle Build Action will prevent leakage of secrets going forward, additional actions may be required due to current or previous GitHub Actions Cache entries containing this information.
Current cache entries will remain vulnerable until they are forcibly deleted or they expire naturally after 7 days of not being used. Potentially vulnerable entries can be easily identified in the GitHub UI by searching for a cache entry with key matching `configuration-cache-*`. The maintainers recommend that users of the Gradle Build Action inspect their list of cache entries and manually delete any that match this pattern.
While maintainers have not seen any evidence of this vulnerability being exploited, they recommend cycling any repository secrets if you cannot be certain that these have not been compromised. Compromise could occur if a user runs a GitHub Actions workflow for a pull request attempting to exploit this data.
Warning signs to look for in a pull request include:
- Making changes to GitHub Actions workflow files in a way that may attempt to read/extract data from the Gradle User Home or `<project-root>/.gradle` directories.
- Making changes to Gradle build files or other executable files that may be invoked by a GitHub Actions workflow, in a way that may attempt to read/extract information from these locations.
Some workarounds to limit the impact of this vulnerability are available:
- If the Gradle project does not opt-in to using the configuration cache, then it is not vulnerable.
- If the Gradle project does opt-in to using the configuration-cache by default, then the `--no-configuration-cache` command-line argument can be used to disable this feature in a GitHub Actions workflow.
In any case, we recommend that users carefully inspect any pull request before approving the execution of GitHub Actions workflows. It may be prudent to require approval for all PRs from external contributors.
CWE-200
Apr 28, 2023