EIP v3: The Exploit Database We Meant to Build
EIP v3 is a rebuilt exploit intelligence system with searchable PoC code, a public read-only API, CLI and MCP, and a review-gated Kimi/Ollama pipeline that publishes CVE labs into the corpus.
23 articles in this topic.
EIP v3 is a rebuilt exploit intelligence system with searchable PoC code, a public read-only API, CLI and MCP, and a review-gated Kimi/Ollama pipeline that publishes CVE labs into the corpus.
A TOCTOU race in VMware Fusion 25's vmx-apple binary that turns booting a VM into arbitrary chown, then arbitrary chown into a passwordless root shell via PAM injection. World-writable sticky directory, SUID-root callee, bind() and chown() both following symlinks, a 5-15 microsecond window between them. Full LPE chain in 40 seconds, single VM boot. The interesting part is what made it reliable.
Hermes Agent with the EIP Harness: a conversational AI vulnerability research assistant that runs full CVE pipelines while you stay in the loop. Built on Nous Research's Hermes. Showcase: a GitLab runner-token leak chained to RCE (CVE-2022-0735), a neatvnc pre-auth stack overflow (CVE-2026-42859), and a KEV-listed Everest Forms PHP Object Injection (CVE-2026-3296), all end to end. Our first public release of EIP CVE pipeline craft, plus win11-forge for Windows kernel and usermode lab orchestration.
CVE-2026-41940: a CRLF session-injection in cPanel & WHM that turns six unauthenticated HTTP requests into root SSH. Source-level walkthrough and audit.
CVE-2026-35414 is a certificate principal matching bypass in OpenSSH before 10.3. The advisory says one bug. We found three - a comma-splitting misuse, an empty-principals wildcard, and a reversed match_pattern call - all hiding in the same commit. Two are independently exploitable for authentication bypass. We built working PoCs for both, then kept reading and found two more undocumented issues: a PermitListen bypass via Unix socket forwarding and a KRL revocation gap for serial-zero certificates.
Line 781 says $query_to_run is safe. It isn't. An autonomous pipeline found a CVSS 9.8 unauthenticated SQL injection in WP Google Map Plugin v4.9.1 -- a three-link chain of individually harmless components that, together, give any visitor full database access. Then we kept reading and found the plugin deserializes update-check responses from an external server with maybe_unserialize(). 200,000+ active installs. 35 minutes. $8.97.
WinForge's maiden voyage: a brand new pipeline module - QEMU VMs instead of Docker, WinDbg instead of GDB, binary diffing instead of source - pointed at a use-after-free in ntoskrnl.exe. 363 functions changed between builds, 8 needles in the haystack, and a PoC that ran 500,000 iterations without crashing. Because that was the point.
A V8 Maglev JIT bug exploited in the wild by state actors. An autonomous pipeline that found it, exploited it in seven attempts, then bypassed both fixes -- in 75 minutes for $14.38. The compiler said it was a Smi. It wasn't.
CVE-2026-4105 dropped this morning - local privilege escalation to root on desktop Linux via systemd-machined. Two D-Bus calls, no authentication. We fed it to CVEForge before the advisory was an hour old. Seventy-two minutes later: confirmed exploit, Docker labs for vulnerable and patched builds, and a bypass proving the vendor's fix is incomplete. The analysis agent said the fix was thorough. The bypass agent proved it wrong.
CVE-2026-28391 is a CVSS 9.8 command injection in OpenClaw < 2026.2.2, caused by a POSIX vs cmd.exe shell-parsing mismatch. Our own suggestion algorithm ranked it as the most interesting CVEForge target. 8/8 bypass vectors confirmed, code execution verified. This is the story of the day our orchestration layer dispatched a full vulnerability assessment against itself.
We forked Shannon a third time. Seven AI agents, source code as the starting point, sanitizer-instrumented builds, and a pipeline that read 259 C files, built its own fuzzing harnesses, ran 18,000 iterations, and found a previously unknown FastCGI protocol desynchronization bug in nginx. Two hours. Twenty-five dollars.
The first post ended with 'not a shell.' This one ends with uid=0(root) - with an asterisk. Ten context windows. A UTF-8 encoding barrier that blocks every libc address. A PLT mapping that lied. A stack alignment problem solved by a NULL pointer and a filename that shouldn't exist. The story of how a pre-auth xrdp overflow became (almost) pure-network RCE - through the most absurd gadget chain we've ever built.
xrdp. Pre-authentication. A full RDP handshake implemented from scratch. UTF-8 encoding constraints that break your ROP chain. A false crash path that wasted hours. And a 3-byte partial overwrite technique that reaches any address in the binary. Stackforge's hardest target yet - and the most honest result.
The public material available during this CVE-2025-62507 run was a crash PoC. StackForge pursued RCE, then repeated the work with ASLR enabled.
We forked Shannon again - this time for binary exploit development. Nine AI agents, GDB as an MCP tool, packet capture via SharkMCP, and a pipeline that turned an OpenSSL stack buffer overflow into three independent ROP chains with GDB-verified RCE. Eighty-five minutes. Twenty-five dollars. Here's how Stackforge works.
CVE-2025-26866 is a Hessian deserialization RCE in Apache HugeGraph PD. Our autonomous exploit pipeline CVEForge - which had completed 56 consecutive CVEs - hit a wall: an undocumented binary protocol, a non-standard serialization format, and a class blacklist blocking every known gadget chain. The agent spent $49 and four hours reverse-engineering SOFABolt, mapping sofa-hessian byte by byte, and finding a JDK-only gadget chain to bypass the blacklist. Then we took over to turn file creation into a proper root shell - navigating JNDI hardening, CC library defenses, and a gadget chain that silently dies on modern JDK. The result: a full Metasploit module.
We left CVEForge running for three days. Twenty-four CVEs went in. All twenty-four produced working PoCs. Ten incomplete fixes triggered eight responsible disclosure submissions - six GitHub issues, one MITRE report, one HackerOne 0-day. Here's the full accounting.
Foreman command injection via the REST API (CVE-2025-10622) and telnetd privilege escalation through environment variable injection (CVE-2026-28372) - CVEForge analyzes both end-to-end. One fix is a proper server-side whitelist. The other is a single unsetenv() call on a blacklist from 1995. Both produced working PoCs. Only one produced a fix we'd trust.
In this CVEForge patch-validation run, we analyze CVE-2025-60355 in OneBlog (Java/FreeMarker) and compare outcomes across five CVEs. Three of five runs ended in confirmed bypass or incomplete-fix results.
After CVEForge's first successful run, we needed to know if it was luck or a pattern. Two more CVEs, zero hand-holding, and an AI agent that found a fix bypass the developers missed.
We forked Shannon - the open-source AI pentesting framework - and wired it to the EIP MCP server. Six AI agents, one CVE number, 32 minutes: a working RCE PoC for a CVSS 10.0 vulnerability with zero existing public exploits. Here's how it happened.
One prompt kicked off an AI agent that built a full PoC lab for CVE-2026-28296 - and discovered the GVFS CRLF injection fix was incomplete. Here's how it happened.
Concrete examples of credential stealers, obfuscated backdoors, and destructive payloads found in public PoC material, with model interpretation kept separate from EIP safety claims.